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Abstract 
This paper investigates the activity of problem-finding at a corporate 
innovation level to understand why companies are not achieving their 
innovation goals beyond the continual improvement of existing 
offerings and businesses. Through a literature review, the investigation 
identifies three key patterns happening in the world of design & 
innovation: the popularization of rapid innovation methods, the nature 
of increasingly complex problems, and the state of the design-led 
innovation consulting industry. The paper takes an autoethnographic 
research approach to collect, analyze, and synthesize data from the 
point of a view of a design consulting practitioner in order to surface 
insights about the dynamics at play between the consultant and the 
client organization. These dynamics are further explored through 
systems thinking, identifying significant balancing loops and potential 
leverage points for introducing new models and interventions that lead 
to better problem-finding outcomes in corporate innovation. The idea 
of shared value between consultant and client emerges as a primary 
leverage point, leading to the discovery of potential solution sets for 
driving new types of consultant-client relationships and business 
models that fully utilize the power of problem-finding at the outset of 
innovation projects.  
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Introduction  
“If I asked people what they wanted, 
they would have said faster horses.” 
-Henry Ford* 
 
1.1 How I got here 
This project originally began as an investigation into the practices and 
behaviours surrounding prototyping amongst individuals, teams, and 
organizations.  
 
Let me explain.  
 
In Spring 2016, I received an exciting phone call. I was asked to lead a 
major innovation project to develop a new concept for a large, 
multinational company. My team was outstanding and the client was 
excited. “It’s the single most important project in the corporation,” I 
was told. 
  
Then I heard the timeline. We had 7 weeks; exactly thirty-five working 
days to go through the design thinking process from start to finish. It 
seemed radical and exciting. A new opportunity to accelerate our work, 
                                                   
* While this quote is frequently attributed to Henry Ford, research efforts to validate this have 
come up short (Vlaskovits, 2011).  
  
 
 2 
make a new client happy, and advance my career as a design-led 
innovation practitioner.  
 
I began rethinking the design thinking process. I squished and 
squeezed and collapsed phases of our traditional project process. I 
voraciously familiarized myself with movements in the startup 
community praising the power of the Lean Startup (Blank, 2013), rapid 
prototyping, and the Design Sprint (Knapp, Zeratsky, & Kowitz, 2016). 
Heck, if the folks at Google Ventures could do this in 5 days, there’s no 
reason our team couldn’t design a new offering in 7 weeks. Everybody 
was doing it!  
 
I reassured myself and our team that we could do it, too. In our 
conversations leading up to the official start of the project, it was made 
clear that this was a redesign. We’d be revamping an existing product to 
make it more user friendly, drive adoption, and, ultimately, generate 
more revenue. The offering would be used by the same customers our 
client served today. Given the circumstances, that was terrific news to 
us. If the client knew the customer already, we could accelerate the 
research phase.  
 
When I showed up on day one of the project, however, it was clear that 
this was more than a redesign. One senior member of the team wanted 
this to be an ambitious play to adapt current offerings and boldly enter 
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new markets to serve new types of customers. Other members of the 
team insisted that this was a core innovation (Nagji & Tuff, 2012) and 
was critical to hitting the financial projections in the proposal the 
business unit had made to executives.  
 
With a contract already in place, timelines and budget set, and 
resources shored up to staff the teams, we couldn’t pursue the big, bold 
innovation. We committed to the core innovation that was already 
identified and began prototyping.  
 
In week one, we had paper prototypes. In week two, we were out in the 
field doing evaluative research. By week three, we were preparing to 
build the new product. We prototyped and tested, prototyped and 
tested, prototyped and tested. And I became obsessed with rapid 
prototyping.  
 
When it came time to pursuing this major research project, then, the 
choice of topic seemed easy. If prototyping at a rapid pace in an 
accelerated way was so successful, why weren’t more organizations 
doing it? 
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As such, my original research questions were as follows: 
 
How might innovation practitioners better build and embed 
prototyping competencies in their teams and organizations?  
 
What factors determine how teams and organizations employ 
prototyping as an innovation competency?  
 
What frameworks, processes, structures, resources, and incentives 
might assist in building and sustaining prototyping competencies?  
 
What I discovered, however, through deep introspection and an 
autoethnographic study of my own reflections and feelings on projects 
of various speeds and levels of ambition, is that looking at prototyping 
alone isn’t enough. As I studied various schools of thought related to 
rapid innovation processes, I became more and more concerned about 
the state of design thinking and corporate innovation.  
 
Each time I was in a position where the pressures of time, budget, or 
the perception of productivity was a factor, there appeared to be a 
choice to be made around whether that individual, team, or 
organization would pursue the act of problem-finding or not.  
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While rapid prototyping had been the surface level observation that 
originally led me to pay particular attention to these moments, I 
realized myself that my true area of interest resided here: in the 
underlying forces, pressures, and levers that influence how companies 
pick the problems they decide to pursue and, therefore, determine how 
they grow.  
 
I was further reminded of this when listening to an interview with 
Richard Tyson, professor of “Systems, Scales, and Consequences”, a 
course for Masters of Design Students at the School of Visual Arts in 
New York City.  
 
Every product of design is itself a shadow. It’s a shadow of 
systems that you cannot see. One way of thinking about design 
has been the perfect configuration and forming and molding and 
experience shaping of the ideal computer mouse, or the iPhone, 
or a cup, etcetera. It’s as if we have the materials and we are 
potters and we shape it into its thingness. We think about the 
product as negative space, or a shadow. What is [a] cup a 
shadow of? It’s a shadow of a coffee distribution system. It’s a 
shadow of international agriculture. It’s a shadow of a 
particular kind of pressed paper made of certain chemicals. It’s a 
type of social contract. It’s signally social behaviour. So how do 
we understand and deeply deconstruct all of the systems of 
which this cup is a shadow? How do we work back from the cup 
to the shadow of all those systems? (Tyson, 2013)  
 
 
I find this to be the perfect analogy for how this research project came 
to be, and how it led me to stumble upon what I believe is the right 
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problem to be addressing and a new set of research questions that re-
frame this challenge.  
 
Using Tyson’s analogy, the nature of how prototyping emerges within a 
project, a team, or an organization is simply the ‘product’. It is a 
reflection of the complex system of patterns, behaviour, structure, and 
mental models underlying the surface-level events of rapid innovation 
processes, although they may be invisible (Meadows, 1972), as shown in 
Figure 1. This is the ‘negative space’ in which Tyson refers. This is 
where there are observations, patterns, insights, and interventions to be 
found.  
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Figure 1: The Iceberg Model 
The Iceberg Model illustrates how to contextualize an issue as part of a whole system 
by connecting events to underlying patterns, structures, and mental models 
(Meadows, 1972).  
 
 
With that in mind, my new research questions - explored in this paper - 
are as follows:  
 
How might innovation practitioners better build and embed problem-
finding competencies in the clients with whom they work?  
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What factors determine how teams and organizations employ 
problem-finding as an innovation competency?  
 
What interventions might assist consulting practitioners in building 
and sustaining problem-finding activities in their work with clients?  
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1.2 Defining ‘problem-finding’ and the ‘design-led 
consultancy’  
 
“To see a problem is a definite addition to knowledge. To recognize a 
problem which can be solved and is worthy of solving is in fact a 
discovery in its own right.” (Polanyi, 1958) 
 
Because this project focuses on the interactions between client 
organization and design-led consulting firms, the term problem-finding 
is considered in the context of the design process. This project assumes 
that “at its most basic level, design can be described as an event that 
begins with an existing state and through some process produces a 
more desirable state” as depicted in Figure 2 (Doblin, 1987). 
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Figure 2: The SPS Model 
The SPS Model illustrates how, at the most basic level, the design process begins with 
an existing state and through some process produces a more desirable state (Doblin, 
1987). 
 
 
Specifically, problem-finding refers to parts of the design process 
whereby the designer dedicates effort not to the solution of a problem, 
but to the discovery, formulation, and framing of what problem is to be 
solved (Getzels, 1979). These activities are commonly referred to as the 
analysis and synthesis stages of design. In analysis, research data is 
broken down into its “constituent parts” (Doblin, 1987), taking a 
detailed and structured approach to understanding what data is 
relevant for the designer. In synthesis, these parts are reassembled into 
patterns, themes, and implications which describe an opportunity - a 
problem is found (Kolko, 2011).  
 
Analysis and synthesis, then, imply that design research has been 
conducted, which marks an important characteristic of design-led 
consultancies which this project holds true throughout this research 
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paper; that any effective design process with ambitions of creating 
meaningful change begins with asking questions to gather data and 
explore context before generating hypotheses or solutions. This use of 
design research, synthesis, and analysis is not apparent, however, when 
one looks at many of the rapid innovation processes popular in today’s 
fast-paced problem-solving world.  
 
To demonstrate this difference, Figure 3 and Figure 4 compare a 
version of innovation professor Vijay Kumar’s view of the design 
research-led innovation process to the begin-by-building process of 
Google’s Design Sprint model, representative of many rapid innovation 
frameworks. Kumar’s process begins with design research, followed by 
analysis and synthesis, and only then moves into prototyping and 
building solutions. Google’s Design Sprint process, however, begins by 
building prototypes, assuming solutions at the outset, and refining 
based on feedback - without consideration for generative, contextual 
research about the intervention, stakeholders, or surrounding system.  
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Figure 3: The Kumar Model 
The Kumar Model illustrates the design-led innovation process moving from research, 
to framing insights through analysis, to exploring concepts and making plans in 
synthesis, and finally prototyping offerings in delivery (Kumar, 2003).  
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Figure 4: Google Ventures' Design Sprint 
Google Ventures’ Design Sprint process, often managed as a 5-day ‘sprint’, promising 
teams to “shortcut the endless-debate cycle and compress months of time into a single 
week” (Knapp, Zeratsky, & Kowitz, 2016).  
 
 
The use of research, analysis, and synthesis within the design process is 
an important distinction to make and, for the purposes of this project, 
will be used to distinguish problem-finding (the focus of the research in 
this project) from problem-solving.  
 
Throughout this paper, I will reference design-led innovation 
consultancies. This term implies that these firms use a version of a 
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design research-led process, similar to Kumar’s, as their primary 
method of conducting work.  
 
It is important to recognize that the ‘design-led consultancy’ takes 
many shapes, particularly as the nature of the industry has changed 
dramatically over the last decade (a topic explored in the Patterns 
section of this paper). The common types of design-led consultancy are 
described in Table 1 below. 
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Classification 
 
 
Examples 
 
Primary customers 
 
Services offered 
 
Independent, external  
 
Jump 
 
Smart Design  
 
Corporate clients seeking 
innovation services 
 
Innovation strategy  
 
New product and concept 
development  
 
Design research and insights 
generation 
 
Design-led innovation 
capability building  
 
 
 
Consultancy-owned 
(typically professional 
services, management 
consulting, and technology 
consulting) 
 
Idea Couture, owned 
by Cognizant 
 
Frog Design, owned by 
Aricent 
 
Doblin, owned by 
Deloitte 
 
Veryday, owned by 
McKinsey 
 
Parent company (through internal 
efforts to innovate) 
 
Corporate clients, sourced either 
independently or through the 
parent company’s existing 
customer base   
 
Industry-owned  
 
Adaptive Path, owned 
by Capital One 
 
Gravity Tank, owned 
by Salesforce  
 
IDEO, part-owned by 
Kyu 
 
Parent company (through internal 
efforts to innovate) 
 
Corporate clients, sourced either 
independently or through the 
parent company’s existing 
customer base   
 
Table 1: Classifications of Design-Led Consultancies 
 
 
Each of the classifications of design-led consultancy above are 
configured in ways suitable to the context of their ownership structure 
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and relationship with given owners. While the services offered may be 
similar across each classification, they are pursued in ways that are 
representative of the ownership structure and the customer of focus. In 
the professional services world, for example, the acquisition of design-
led consultancies has been seen to add value in multiple ways: (i) the 
new design-led capabilities contribute to existing clients of the parent 
firm, driving growth through additional offerings that the parent firm 
can then make available to their client base, (ii) the design-led 
capabilities are targeted at the parent firm’s own business, enhancing 
existing professional services offerings by improving the client 
experience, identifying new growth options, and designing new 
professional service innovations, and (iii) the design-led firm continues 
to pursue their own clients independent of the parent firm and, in some 
cases, brings the capabilities of their parent firm to their clients.  
 
These configurations are each an indication of the strategy and growth 
goals of each respective firm (both parent and design-led consultancy). 
They also may indicate the attitude and value of design within each 
sector or firm.  This is an important observation to, first, call out that 
the notion of a design-led consultancy is rapidly evolving as design is 
accepted and integrated into a variety of industry and business 
functional areas, as demonstrated in the table and explored later in this 
paper. Additionally, as the notion of the design-led consultancy evolves, 
new implications will emerge for the state of problem-finding and 
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design research activities. In the professional services firm, for 
example, where a primary business model relies on core services such 
as traditional management or operations consulting, the design-led 
capabilities may be diffused in a way so as to amplify existing 
approaches and offerings of the parent firm, instead of introducing and 
fully leveraging the design research and problem-finding activities 
which the design-led team is equipped to pursue. The consequence and 
insight here is that, depending on the configuration of the design-led 
consultancy and their relationship to a parent firm, true problem-
finding may or may not be diffused into the new places where design 
firms are showing up.  
 
Take the example of a professional services firm conducting an 
engagement with an automobile manufacturing client. In the case of 
the traditional management consultancy, the process would typically 
start with rigorous analysis about the state of the business today: 
operations, lines of business, market trends, competitors. Using this 
analytical assessment, a set of strategic options or hypotheses may be 
developed, which are then subjected to further analysis in an effort to 
narrow in on a best option. If this management consultancy happened 
to own a design-led consultancy, this process may change. The degree 
to which it changes depends on the configuration of the relationship 
between both firms, and the value the parent firms sees in design-led 
approaches. 
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In this example, the design-led firm may be engaged to drive a true 
problem-finding approach which might generate a view of the problem 
as being one outside of where the traditional consultancy may typically 
look or bound the analysis. What is the cultural significance of the 
automobile in society? What broader trends are driving change in the 
way that people and goods are moved through urban spaces? Who are 
the actors across the mobility ecosystem and what are their needs?  
This search for inspiration and clarification of the broader problem 
through design research within the industry but also in peripheral 
spaces is what marks the distinction between traditional and design-led 
consultancies.  
 
However, if the traditional consultancy was of the mindset that 
beginning with a hypothesis-led approach was in fact the most 
appropriate way to tackle the engagement, the role of the design-led 
consultancy changes. They may be brought in only to prototype and test 
ideas in a way that leverages a process more aligned to the Design 
Sprint model than Kumar’s innovation model.   
 
The point here is that the configuration and integration of the design-
led consultancy’s capabilities is highly dependent on the specific 
configuration of that firm and way the consultancy is situated within it. 
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Each of these possibilities is further influenced by funding mechanisms, 
reporting and measurement structures, and branding – and the 
tradeoffs that come with those decisions. When a well-known design-
led consultancy changes their name to fold into the parent firm, for 
example, what impact does this have on the design-led talent that flows 
into the firm? And what does this mean for the competencies and 
capabilities that enable problem-finding activities? How are the values 
between those two firms aligned and negotiated? As the frequency of 
design firm acquisitions increases, the way in which the diffusion of 
design-led capabilities unfolds remains to be seen (KPCB, 2016).  
 
Finally, when this project refers to the design-led consultancy and the 
act of problem-finding, it excludes the notion of traditional Design 
practice firms. As explained, this paper assumes design-led 
consultancies employ problem-finding and design research techniques 
as a primary way of approach engagements. Design practice firms, 
however, operate within traditional Design disciplines such as graphic 
design and industrial design. While these Design disciplines may 
contribute to greater outputs in design-led consulting approaches, they 
are not sufficient for the complex nature of problems that are typically 
tackled.   
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1.3 Researcher identity memo  
This project is a culmination of nearly a decade of my own work in the 
field of innovation, strategy, and design-led approaches. From the 
outset of my career, I have been focused on deploying these methods to 
help companies identify and tackle problems that are worth solving.  In 
doing so, I have experienced the challenge of problem-finding through 
a number of different lenses: 
 
•   within industry working in the innovation function of a large, 
multinational private corporation 
•   as startup entrepreneur with only a handful of employees, free of 
the constraints and advantages of established capabilities or 
assets 
•   within the world of professional services as an innovation 
consulting practitioner and manager with one of the world’s 
largest consultancies serving complex corporate clients 
•   as a graduate student in the Master of Design in Strategic 
Foresight and Innovation program at OCAD University   
 
Throughout each of these periods in my work, I have played both sides 
of the problem-finding dilemma, sometimes pressing for more speed, 
sometimes urging a team or client to slow down to find and frame the 
problem worth solving.  
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I also have a unique view into this problem as an employee of a design-
led innovation firm that was recently purchased by a traditional 
professional services consultancy. As described later in this paper, this 
trend is a major shift identified through my literature review. As such, I 
have an inherent bias in the perspective I take: I believe the external 
design consulting firm will continue to play a role in the future of how 
corporations drive innovation and pursue new opportunities. I have a 
clear incentive in this future(s) unfolding.  
 
I hold a view that it is increasingly difficult for organizations to slow 
down and be thoughtful and purposeful in how they go about finding 
problems to solve. In an era of rapid innovations and doing business at 
breakneck speed, this is understandably so. My work as a consultant 
educated at a graduate level in applying generative design research and 
strategy development methods means I believe in the power of 
problem-finding and advocate for it. I do so because I feel passionately 
that if companies were more purposeful in problem-finding, their 
returns on innovation spending would be significantly higher, the 
impact on their customers and markets significantly increased, and - at 
a macro level - the overall quality of life and society would be improved.   
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1.4 Rationale: Why this problem is important 
The main outcome from this project is to fill a gap in existing research 
around how problem-finding competencies are built, embedded, and 
sustained in organizations - in addition to conducting research which 
equips innovation practitioners with specific findings and tools to 
inspire and implement those competencies successfully. This project is 
an opportunity for me to better understand problem-finding from both 
a systemic perspective as well as an in-depth individual and personal 
standpoint.  
 
Over the last several years as a practicing innovation consultant, I have 
witnessed the power of problem-finding to dramatically change the way 
teams think about innovation and growth. More importantly, I have 
seen the power of problem-finding to change individuals; executives 
who go on to communicate and inspire an innovation ambition, non-
designers who are empowered to make significant contributions to 
design-based teams through problem-finding, and newfound design 
thinkers who discover the power of problem-finding to uncover deep, 
human-centered insights that lead to meaningful innovations. 
 
On the other hand, I have also witnessed the opposite. I have seen 
corporations forego the act of problem-finding to pursue solutions that 
are near and dear to the core business and that rely only on 
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assumptions about emerging drivers of change and customer needs. I 
have seen countless organizations inspire visions for speed of 
innovation delivery, without articulating clear intent or ambition. And I 
have seen teams get excited about the rapid results of prototypes and 
positive customer feedback, only to be caught off-guard when a new, 
breakthrough innovation enters their market from an unsuspecting 
player, reframing a problem for those customers, and further putting 
pressure on the incumbent’s core business. This pattern and vicious 
cycle is one that persists and is difficult to escape.  
 
In the day-to-day nature of innovation consulting, there is a love-hate 
relationship with problem-finding. Despite the dramatic impact 
problem-finding can have on change-makers’ abilities to identify and 
drive important innovations forward, the uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
resource issues can make it a challenging activity to pursue in a world 
of billable hours, utilization, and fixed fee consulting. This project is a 
unique opportunity to deliberately and thoughtfully examine the act of 
problem-finding and the systemic reasons why it does or does not 
happen in an effort to aid design-led consultancies to better align the 
way they do business to support effective problem-finding activities. 
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1.5 The consequences of not problem-finding 
What happens if organizations overlook the value of problem-finding 
and design research altogether? What are the consequences of 
continually pursuing rapid innovations - at the expense of longer-term 
investments in higher-ambition innovations - in response to the 
pressures on the core business? The potential scenarios illuminated by 
these questions raise speculations about the long-term health of 
organizations and their ability to navigate uncertain futures. When 
speed becomes the unit of analysis by which companies measure their 
innovation effectiveness, other efforts to tackle harder, more complex 
opportunities and challenges dwindle.  
 
The increasingly excessive short-termism of organizations may be 
driven by the rapid pace of change and volatility in today’s business 
environments. According to research by the Boston Consulting Group, 
businesses move through their lifecycles twice as quickly as they did 30 
years ago. “Such a state of affairs naturally focuses attention on the very 
short term: on dynamism and unpredictability and how these 
necessitate agility and adaptation. Equally important, however, are the 
longer-term consequences for corporations” (Reeves & Pueschel, 2015). 
 
It could be said, then, that when companies decide to not pursue 
problem-finding activities when conducting innovation projects, their 
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alternative is to continue working on problems that are already part of 
the core business. If the environment is changing as much as Boston 
Consulting Group suggests, those problems quickly become irrelevant. 
As organizations continue to invest in rapid innovation in core 
problems, then, they also continue to accrue a greater and greater 
deficiency between the problems they choose to work on and those that 
are relevant in their new business environment. When this growing 
deficiency puts further pressure on the business, the inclination to 
focus on the short-term pains of quarterly results and immediate sales 
opportunities further increases this deficiency, introducing a vicious 
cycle of short-termism that becomes difficult to escape because of two 
reinforcing pressures: the increasing pace of change in the external 
environment, and the increasing pressure to invest in core innovations. 
This cycle will be explored in more detail later in this project.  
 
Then consider the risks of avoiding problem-finding in an increasingly 
complex and connected world. With the advent of big data, the Internet 
of Things, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, a greater 
number of innovations are no longer isolated products or services with 
a relatively small sphere of influence. Instead, new offerings are often 
part of a “system of systems” (Kalaher, 2015). The significance of this 
transition to a more interconnected world means that the organizations 
who launch these new offerings are now, in the words of global design 
firm Frog Design, in the business of “Big Design,” in which there is “a 
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shift of value to the system, away from the device” (Kalaher & Tyson, 
2015) as depicted in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Scale and Complexity of Systems 
Global design firm Frog Design illustrates the increasing scale and complexity of 
systems in an interconnected world (Kalaher & Tyson, 2015).  
 
 
As such, the sphere of influence of new offerings - and even their 
prototypes - is much larger and interconnected, spanning a human, 
enterprise, urban, and even planetary scale. To forego the act of 
problem-finding, then, also implies foregoing a deep understanding of 
the consequences of a new intervention or innovation moving into 
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these interconnected systems. If this is true, it also suggests that the 
unintended consequences of any given innovation to be greater in 
number and severity.  
 
For design-led consultancies, the impacts are felt in connected but 
different ways. At a time when design education - and even non-design 
education (Rhodes, 2016) - is introducing design-thinking, systems 
thinking, and strategic foresight methods (OCAD University, n.d.), the 
rise of rapid innovation processes like Design Sprints, Lean Startup, 
and Agile often mean that the problem-finding activities such as design 
research, analysis, and synthesis are no longer inherent parts of the 
design and innovation process. Thus, the skills, mindsets, and methods 
that are being taught to emerging cohorts of design-thinking 
practitioners are not being utilized in professional practice. The 
consequences here are that, if design-led consultancies continue to 
cater to the rapid nature of their client organizations’ behaviours, it is 
likely that top design research talent is going to feel overlooked and 
underutilized. Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the rise of these design-
led innovation approaches in traditional design educational institutions 
and also non-design institutions such as business schools.  
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Figure 6: OCAD University's Master of Design in Strategic Foresight and Innovation 
OCAD University’s Master of Design in Strategic Foresight and Innovation program 
combines design thinking, business thinking, futures thinking, systems thinking, and 
visual thinking to teach “complex problem finding, framing and solving, to envision 
and develop sustainable futures” (OCAD University, n.d).  
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Figure 7: Design Education in Non-Design Institutions 
Even within non-design educational institutions, such as business schools, the 
presence of design and innovation learning opportunities is increasing (Kleiner 
Perkins Caufield & Byers, 2016). Further research is required to understand the 
degree to which design research and problem-finding are part of how these 
institutions define design and innovation.  
 
 
For these reasons, the exploration of this topic is critical. As the 
lifespan of organizations shortens, the pace of change accelerates, and 
the consequences of any given intervention become heightened, the 
need for problem-finding in the innovation process becomes 
increasingly important. Furthermore, as a new generation of innovators 
equipped with new, integrated skills spanning design research, 
analysis, synthesis, and foresight move into their careers, where will 
they find a home? How will design-led consultancies attract the talent 
that is necessary for leading significant, high-ambition change?  
  
 
 30 
 
2.0 Research approach 
In this section, I outline the research approach and rationale for the 
methods used including: 
●   a literature review and synthesis of patterns discovered 
●   an autoethnographic study to deeply understand my own thoughts 
and reflections across key moments and artifacts related to 
problem-finding 
●   a systems map to identify forces at play when it comes to the level 
of ambition related to innovation projects, and therefore the 
requirement for problem-finding activities within corporate 
innovation initiatives  
●   analysis and synthesis to determine a set of insights related to 
how companies make decisions about the level of problem-finding 
they utilize in innovation projects and how design-led innovation 
consulting practitioners work through these dynamics 
●   A 2x2 didactic used to generate new solution sets and 
interventions aimed at developing more favourable conditions for 
problem-finding exercises between consultant and client 
 
As stated earlier, this major research project has largely been driven by 
my personal experience. As a consultant and practitioner, I have felt the 
pressures and tensions of corporate innovation and growth within the 
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bounds of existing resources, ambition, and time. I have also felt those 
pressures within the context of working in industry in an innovation 
function for a large, multinational manufacturer. Given this range of 
personal experience, I felt it was important to engage myself in gaining 
more thorough understanding of contextual landscape and deep 
feelings and emotions that lead to the choices around innovation 
methods, problem finding, ambition, and investment.  
 
Although still an emerging practice within the field of design research, 
autoethnography helps to draw insights from three interconnected 
concepts: culture, self, and others (Chang, 2008). In this way, it 
allowed for a deep sense of empathy through my own purposeful 
reflection and through deliberate efforts to understand those reflections 
as they relate to the bigger system I was mapping throughout the 
project. Given the challenges of time and scope related to this project, 
in addition to the confidentiality issues surrounding consulting 
practitioners and their work, autoethnography was a fitting way to 
approach the research. Here, autoethnography would allow the project 
to get to deeper insights that would not be possible through participant 
interviews. As an initial literature review revealed that a tremendous 
amount of research had been conducted at an organizational level 
around innovation, strategy, and capability building, this would provide 
a level of insight from the perspective of the individual practitioner, 
which is relatively underrepresented in existing works.  
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This project, however, deals with a complex adaptive system (CAS) 
(Jones, n.d.) which is made up of more than just practitioners. It 
includes actors such as teams, organizations, clients, and entire 
industries and economies. It is made up of many different stakeholders, 
each with their own lens on the world and motivations for how they 
make decisions. In addition to the stakeholder complexity within this 
ecosystem, there is also significant change emerging based on the state 
of corporate innovation and the degree to which design and design 
thinking skills are diffused and democratized (Manzini, 2015). As a 
multidisciplinary designer with personal, lived experience from the 
perspective of multiple actors within the system of study, I believe I am 
uniquely positioned to approach the research through my own 
autoethnographic inquiry.  
 
With this in mind, the approach and methods for this project, explained 
below, were selected with the goal of identifying and defining problems 
which might point to solution sets and future research efforts that could 
make a contribution and lead to significant impact in this system.  
2.1 Literature review 
Extensive secondary research was conducted to develop foundational 
knowledge in the areas of prototyping, problem complexity, design and 
innovation consultancies, innovation capability building in 
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organizations, and the rising popularity of rapid innovation methods. 
This literature review helped to form the basis for identifying 
stakeholders and important trends across the industry, ultimately 
leading to a synthesized summary outlining three key patterns 
identified as important for this project.  
2.2 Systems mapping 
Given the complexity of this topic area and the goals to ‘zoom out’ 
(Mella, 2012) and identify these problems and leverage points 
(Meadows, 2009) for change, a systems mapping approach was used.  
This systems approach was a way to apply the observations and insights 
gathered through autoethnography and attempt to understand them at 
a greater scale and in the context of other actors and lenses within the 
system in order to find more meaningful and impactful opportunities 
for change, while also understanding the limitations and challenges of 
any proposed interventions. System archetypes and frameworks were 
gathered from existing research, as identified in the literature review.   
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2.3 Autoethnographic experience audit 
Autoethnography can be defined as “autobiographies that self-
consciously explore the interplay of the introspective, personally 
engaged self with cultural descriptions mediated through language, 
history, and ethnographic explanation” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  
 
Drawing from the social sciences and, more recently, literature and 
journalism, I chose to take a “reflexive ethnography” approach to 
understanding my own experience. This approach involves “authors 
using their own experiences in the culture reflexively to bend back on 
self and look more deeply at self-other interaction” (Ellis & Bochner, 
2000). As a consultant and practitioner this gave me a starting point, 
through self-focus, to take an inventory identifying and analyzing 
moments of interest throughout consulting engagements. While this 
starting point was through the lens of self, researchers who use 
autoethnography understand that the data collected is an indication of 
much more, often highlighting dynamics in the broader system 
surrounding oneself and pointing to a “series of overlapping, concentric 
circles with others” (Nash, 2002). Self, then, is an avenue through 
which one can gain an understanding of others and societal culture 
(Duckart, 2005). This sociocultural context within my reflections 
allowed me to understand my own self narrative and - in those 
moments of interest - compare and contrast to other actors and forces 
present in that particular situation.  
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Finally, the selection of autoethnography as a method also represented 
the possibility of - over and above this research project itself - 
conducting a deeply meaningful, personal, and introspective inquiry 
into a subject area that is important to me. In the regular day-to-day 
work environment, this is a rare opportunity. My hope here is that I 
build a greater sense of awareness, skill, and maturity around my own 
behaviours, actions, and emotions in the very situations that have 
motivated me to pursue this project, program, and research project in 
the first place. Given my nearly 10 years’ experience leveraging design 
methods to tackle innovation and growth problems, turning the 
research perspective on myself meant taking stock and leveraging a rich 
set of experiences in a disciplined process with dedicated research time.  
 
2.4 Data collection, analysis, and synthesis  
Themes from the literature review were created using an analysis and 
sorting technique informed by an affinity mapping approach (Kumar, 
2013).  
 
In order to study my own experiences and reflections within the 
innovation process, I took an approach that allowed me to chronicle my 
past using an autobiographical timeline. An autobiographical timeline 
“lists events or experiences from your life in chronological order. It can 
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cover the whole span of life or a limited time period or stage of life. It 
can include all major events or only those relevant to a specific theme 
during a predetermined time span” (Chang, 2007).  
 
Rather than an ongoing journal, which can be subject to “a total sense 
of randomness in your data collection” (Chang, 2008), I elected to 
utilize a specific autoethnographic method call inventorying to code 
and analyze my observations. “First considering your research focus 
and make list of thematic categories relevant to your study. Then you 
rummage through the storehouse of your memory, pick up the relevant 
bits of information on themes, and give an order to the thematically 
collected bits” (Chang, 2008).  
 
This inventorying took the form of listing out, through memory of my 
own experiences, an inventory of items within four thematic categories: 
proverbs, rituals, mentors & actors, and cultural artifacts (Chang, 
2007). For each item, I identified personal notes and reflections about 
its significance and the implications from a cognitive, emotional, and 
social perspective. This is explained in Table 2 below.  
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Object of observation Description(s) 
Proverbs “A condensed but memorable saying 
embodying some important fact of 
experience that is taken as true by many 
people” (Princeton University, 2006). 
Rituals “A passage where genuine 
transformations of character and social 
relationships may occur” (Turner, 1967).  
 
“Include both formal and informal and 
happy and sad occasions” (Chang, 2008).  
Mentors and actors “Mentors are wise and trusted guides and 
advisors or teachers or trusted 
counselors” (Princeton University, 2006).  
 
“This can be used broadly to include 
anyone - whether older or younger than 
you - from whom you have learned new 
knowledge, skills, principles, wisdom, or 
perspectives that have made an impact on 
your life.” (Chang, 2007) 
 
“Although the mentor-mentee 
relationship alludes to a hierarchical 
relationship between a master and an 
apprentice, it need not preclude 
horizontal relationships because, as Mead 
observed, socialization can happen in all 
directions.” (Chang, 2007).  
Cultural artifacts “Cultural artifacts are objects produced by 
members of the society that explicitly or 
implicitly manifest societal norms and 
values” (Chang, 2007). 
 
Table 2: Framework for Autoethnographic Experience Audits (Chang, 2008) 
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2.5 Limitations of this study 
Given that my research was particularly well suited for an 
autoethnographic study to reveal deep-seated, personal reflections and 
insights, it should be noted that the findings here are not representative 
of the broader population of consultants, practitioners, or designers. As 
a single individual, my identity, thoughts, and behaviours are of course 
shaped by my own preconceptions from prior experience, cultural 
upbringing, socio-economic status, sense of self, and social norms from 
environments where I have lived and worked. These were important 
considerations when selecting methods and the choice to pursue 
autoethnography factored in this trade-off between deep reflection and 
restricted sample size.  
 
With respect to the project timeline, the scope of this project was 
limited to a feasible set of activities and methods. As a result, it is likely 
that there is a level of depth and breadth not represented in the 
research specifically related to how organizations configure for 
innovation, how leaders and teams make decisions, significant and 
broader changes affecting industries which purchase design and 
innovation consulting services, and a rigorous, exhaustive study of the 
societal, technological, economic, environmental, political, and values-
based drivers of change.  
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As it applies to systems mapping, a boundary and level of scale was 
selected to give sufficient context to illustrate and animate the findings 
from the literature review and autoethnographic study. Given the 
complexity of the industry and drivers of change that exist, detailed 
systems mapping at a greater scale was not possible, but is a natural 
next step for future research following this project.     
 
Finally, the nature of my work and our practice’s clients have two 
importation implications for this project. First and foremost, it was a 
critical consideration of mine to keep any project information generic. 
Client names have been replaced with pseudonyms and no information 
beyond the nature of my own feelings and reflections were recorded or 
expressed in the research. Second, the projects in which my 
autoethnographic study were based have all taken place with large, 
complex, multinational for-profit firms. This context certainly 
influences the nature of the challenges at play in any given engagement 
and may not apply to organizations of all sizes or configurations.  
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3.0 Patterns from the literature  
In order to better understand the underlying changes and trends 
occurring in the design and innovation consulting industry, a synthesis 
of the literature review was conducted. This synthesis identified five key 
patterns that point to areas of interest for exploration in the 
autoethnographic study. As these themes are the result of the 
contextual research uncovered in the literature review, they do not 
prioritize any particular user. Rather, they represent a broad study of 
relative subject areas and the implications for further research. This 
synthesis identified five key shifts that point to areas of interest for 
exploration in the autoethnographic study.  
 
3.1 Pattern 1: Fast design     
Increasingly, innovation processes emphasize the importance of rapid 
prototyping as a way to value experimentation and hypothesis testing 
(Blank, 2013).  
 
Prototypes play an integral part of design thinking and innovation 
processes. They are used by teams as a method for representing ideas in 
ways that are faster, cheaper, and less risky than developing full-scale 
productions. Additionally, prototyping, the act of making prototypes, 
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has been seen to have positive impacts within organizations including 
higher productivity, greater collaboration, faster iteration cycles, and 
improved learning (Suri, 2007).  
 
Despite this seemingly simple definition, there is a wide range in the 
ways which prototypes can be used, valued, and understood. 
Depending on the individual, team, or organization, prototypes may be 
used to provoke thought amongst a group of stakeholders (Boer, 
Donovan, & Buur, 2013), to generate research insights (Sanders, 2014), 
to evaluate the usefulness and experience of a concept (Houde, 1997), 
or to test and “kill bad ideas” (Rossler, n.d.).  
 
In addition to the range of ways in which prototypes can be used, there 
is an equally wide range when it comes to what is being prototyped. 
While more commonly thought of as useful in the development of 
physical and digital products, significant research has been done 
documenting how prototypes can be used in the design of strategies, 
business models, services, experiences, channels, public policy, and 
more (Keeley, 2013).  
 
Despite the documented benefits and broad range of applicability for 
prototypes in general - not to mention the increasing need for 
companies to pursue innovation to remain competitive - organizations 
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and the individuals within them often face significant challenges when 
introducing and embedding prototyping as a core innovation 
competency. In his 2006 piece, “Cultures of Prototyping”, Michael 
Schrage describes the three parameters which make up any given 
organization’s use of prototypes: the relationship between prototypes 
and specifications, the media which is used, and timing (both speed 
and phases) (Schrage, 2006). Although Schrage’s research draws on 
organizations which he describes as creating prototype-driven 
specifications, it is unclear how those organizations decided to pursue 
the concepts represented in those prototypes in the first place.  
 
At an organizational level, Jane Fulton-Suri of IDEO identifies that 
prototypes lead to change by learning to build-to-think, failing earlier 
and faster, and giving permission to explore new behaviours (Suri, 
2006).  
 
While the benefits and challenges of prototyping are clear from an 
iteration, customer feedback, and even an organizational level, in many 
circles rapid prototyping is seen as core of the design and innovation 
process. Schools of thought originating in Silicon Valley and startup 
culture include Google Design Sprints, Lean Startups, and Customer 
Development. These philosophies encourage getting to a testable 
version of a new concept as early as possible in order to gather 
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evaluative feedback from customers and ‘pivot’ based on results. An 
example is shown in Figure 8. The focus on speed drives a process that 
often starts with a hypothesis and built out in any form of cheap, fast, 
low-fidelity prototype. This means that the build-test-learn-iterate 
process being adopted by startups and corporate innovators relies 
largely on evaluative research instead of generative research, focusing 
on either proving or disproving a hypothesis and converging on 
versions of the prototype that test well with users.  
 
 
Figure 8: Google Ventures' Design Sprint 
Google Ventures Design Sprint process (Knapp, Zeratsky, & Kowitz, 2016).  
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Figure 9: Google Ventures' 5-Day Sprint Process 
Google Ventures Design Sprint process five-day workflow (Knapp, Zeratsky, & Kowitz, 
2016).  
 
 
The popularization of these rapid prototyping processes, focused on 
solution finding through hypothesis-led iteration, does not leave room 
for problem-finding. This may work well for continuous improvement 
or core innovation efforts. In cases where organizations are seeking 
higher-ambition growth opportunities, however, they may be 
inadequate, particularly in cases where the organization is expanding 
into new markets and segments with customers they have not served 
before. When assumptions are made about the user and what their 
needs are, critical parts of the design thinking process are overlooked: 
understanding the contextual landscape, identifying drivers of change, 
developing future-looking scenarios, the diversity of stakeholders and 
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their respective needs. As a result, these rapid innovations processes 
fail to deliver breakthrough innovations beyond features, functions, or 
components of an offering.  
 
Furthermore, organizations frequently mistake hypotheses for 
opportunities. A 2016 article in Forbes tells the story of a heavy 
equipment manufacturer taking notice of the rise of digital technologies 
and the sharing economy. Instead of jumping to prototyping solutions 
in the build-test-learn-iterate cycles praised in startup circles, the 
organization recognized the bigger macro trends as an opportunity to 
pursue broader exploration in order to better understand the problems 
that might be worth solving.  
[We used] research methods to understand the full ecosystem 
and unmet needs in this space, which was far more complex and 
surprising than anyone initially understood. The six weeks spent 
conducting that research paid off in spades in fueling the 
resulting business: an expansive online sharing platform for 
large equipment, accessories, labor and material that transforms 
the way tomorrow’s builders work, connecting multiple 
stakeholders across the construction landscape and yielding 
multiple revenue streams for our client. If we’d pushed to a more 
concrete and testable hypothesis at the outset - an Uber-like 
model that connects idle equipment with end-users - we would 
have dismissed multiple elements of the resulting platform and 
captured less than 20% of the full opportunity. In general, the 
more ambiguous (and likely ambitious) the opportunity, the less 
likely we can start with a hypothesis and begin iterating. We 
need to do the real, hard work of understanding and exploring 
the space to develop first to have any hope of developing one 
that’s worth testing (Quinn, 2016).  
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What’s interesting about the story is the connection Quinn makes 
between methods and ambition. While rapid methods may be 
compelling, the implied trade-off when pursuing the design of a new 
offering was in the potential that significant value will be overlooked by 
dismissing the emergent opportunities that might surface during the 
process of doing more generative, problem-finding based research. 
(Knapp, Zeratsky, & Kowitz, 2016) (Blank, 2013) (Ries, n.d.).   
 
In many ways, however, it is easy to see the allure of the rapid 
innovation process. For the organization, it produces tangible results 
and certainty quickly. This may be the result of avoiding certain levels 
of ambiguity altogether, but in the fast-paced environment of today’s 
organizations, rapid iteration cycles check many of the boxes that are 
required of executives: agility, customer input, and speed.  
 
One example here is General Electric’s recent introduction of a product 
development process called FastWorks. In 2013, the CEO of GE 
Appliances introduced the Lean Startup methodology into the business 
with the challenge to design a refrigerator with doors that open from 
the middle, instead of the traditional side hinge. “You’re going to 
change every part the customer sees. You won’t have a lot of money. 
There will be a very small team. There will be a working product in 3 
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months. And you will have a production product in 11 or 12 months.” 
(Power, 2014).  
 
As an innovation consultant, these same pressures are ones I observe 
frequently. In my experience, executives will often point out the need to 
drive ambitious growth to meet future needs. The work that gets 
funded and executed, however, takes the shape of core innovation that 
utilizes less problem-finding methods and more prototyping to develop 
results sooner - an area of focus in the autoethnographic study of this 
project.  
 
3.2 Pattern 2: Bigger problems   
At the same time as the popularization of rapid innovation and 
prototyping methods infiltrates the world of corporate innovation, an 
interesting counter trend is emerging in the form of the design and 
innovation community calling for new models to better tackle and solve 
increasingly complex problems at a societal level. The volatile, 
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous - VUCA - nature found at the 
convergence of technological, economic, environmental, and political 
shifts requires organizations to be constantly innovating and a scale 
and scope that is unprecedented (Wolf, 2007). Multiple signals 
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uncovered within the literature review point to this pattern, which are 
described below.  
 
First, a relatively recent model has been developed by Carnegie Mellon 
University, Transition Design, depicted in Figure 9. Transition Design 
is defined as a “new area of design research, practice, and study that 
proposes design-led societal transition toward more sustainable 
futures” (School of Design, Carnegie Mellon University, 2015). 
Acknowledging the complexity of massive, radical societal transitions 
that are needed in order to deal with challenges like climate change, 
loss of biodiversity, and widening inequality, Transition Design calls for 
completely new ways of designing for these never-designed-for-before 
scale of wicked problems. Part of this call is a better integration across 
disciplines including psychology, design, sociology, anthropology, and 
the humanities.  
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Figure 10: Transition Design 
Transition Design (School of Design, Carnegie Mellon University, 2015).  
 
 
In particular contrast to the ideas of rapid prototyping and innovation 
methods, the Transition Design model includes a future-oriented vision 
that is open-ended and speculative, calls for theories of change that are 
at a systems and societal level, introduces a mindset shift to reconsider 
a way of ‘being’ in the world, and presents a new way of designing in the 
present that views a single design as only one step towards a more 
ambitious future (School of Design, Carnegie Mellon University, 2015). 
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Figure 11: Transition Design (II) 
Transition Design offers an escalating view of design ranging from classical design 
practice as in the “Built World” to “Transition Design” focused on radical changes that 
are closer in complexity to those found in the Natural World (School of Design, 
Carnegie Mellon University, 2015).  
 
 
Similarly, design critic and academic Don Norman offers an evolving 
view of the nature of problems where design can play a role in his 
manifesto DesignX: “a new, evidence-based approach for addressing 
many of the complex and serious problems facing the world today. It 
adds to, and augments today’s design methods, reformulating the role 
that design can play.” (DesignX, n.d.). Norman argues that the role of 
the modern designer has moved beyond designing traditional products 
and now to approaching large, complex systems by engaging 
practitioners from multiple disciplines. “In the past, design has focused 
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upon products and services, but the design methods of continual, 
iterative cycles of exploration, reflection, implementation and 
validation can be applied to many societal problems.... Problems are 
more volatile than ever before, and information often changes faster 
than it can be validated. This is why we need a new research tradition.” 
(DesignX, n.d.). 
 
Furthermore, this pattern of the expanding role of design parallels 
Richard Buchanan’s ‘Orders of Design’ framework, in which he 
conceptualizes a hierarchy and trajectory by which design thinking will 
evolve, depicted in Figure 12. Tonkinwise and Norman’s emerging 
models support Buchanan’s notion that design will continue to evolve 
towards the 4th order, Systems & Values. 
 
 
Figure 12: Orders of Design (Buchanan, 2001)
 
 
While both Norman and Tonkinwise cite the value of iterative 
innovation, or incrementalism, as a way to make progress while gaining 
  
 
 52 
the buy-in of stakeholders, the clear differences lie in the way that 
iteration unfolds, and in what sequence, throughout the design process. 
In Transition Design, iteration and evaluative methods occur after a 
long-term, futures-oriented vision has been determined. Then, iterative 
sequencing of transitions is introduced as a new mindset and way of 
‘being’ is discovered. In DesignX, Norman calls for new types and 
methods of prototyping and iteration that are more appropriate for the 
nature of the complex problems society faces.  
 
Some research even suggests that, given the complexity of today’s 
problems requiring designers and design thinkers, prototyping might 
not just be an inadequate method of finding or solving problems, but 
also introduce new risks and consequences. In response to the 
popularization of Lean and Agile methods of rapid product 
development, Tonkinwise questions their effectiveness going so far as 
to call them a “deliberate ignoring of imagining future consequential 
risks,” and stating that “there is a similar antivisioning driving these 
hackathons, and in all the rapid building there is also no anticipation of 
consequential risk.” (Tonkinwise, n.d.). With the rise of digital 
platforms and innovations, these “generalized prototyping” methods 
rely on live testing with real users, unlike the historical application of 
prototypes with beta users. This live release of rapidly built prototypes 
into increasingly complex sociotechnical systems presents new kinds of 
risks.  
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This review of contemporary literature is quite concerning when it 
comes to the limitations of rapid prototyping and design methods to 
solve the complex problems now faced by society. When compared to 
the popularization and rise of these rapid methods, this call from the 
likes of Norman and Tonkinwise signal a distinct contrast directly 
related to the research questions of why firms and groups of people do 
not pursue problem-finding in their innovation work. Exploring these 
two alternative, quite extreme perspectives highlights the need and 
importance to more deeply understand the specific systemic levers at 
play that drive designers, innovators, and problems solvers to utilize 
certain design processes and frameworks when finding and 
approaching problems.  
 
3.3 Pattern 3: Disappearing design firms  
As rapid prototyping and design methods have become popularized and 
democratized and, simultaneously, there is a significant and trending 
increase in the scale and complexity of problems which designers face, 
another interesting pattern emerges when investigating the world of 
design-led innovation.  
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This pattern emerges specifically when we look at the state of the 
industry that is made up of design and innovation consulting firms 
which sell their services to large organizations to help solve problems, 
identify new growth opportunities, and pursue building innovation 
capabilities (as detailed earlier in this project on page 15).  
 
Over the last two decades, the once thriving design and innovation 
consulting industry has almost all but disappeared as large professional 
service consultancies and industry clients have acquired them. How is it 
that when design is needed most for finding and solving societal level 
complex problems, there is a contraction of the design and innovation 
consulting industry?  
 
Firms like Frog Design (Aricent), IDEO (Kyu), Doblin (Monitor Group, 
Deloitte), Adaptive Path (Capital One), Gravity Tank (Salesforce), 
Veryday (McKinsey), Fahrenheit 212 (Capgemini), Fjord (Accenture), 
Idea Couture (Cognizant), and Lunar Design (McKinsey) have all been 
snatched up and acquired by mega consultancies, financial services 
firms, and technology companies (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 
2016). Corporations that aren’t busy acquiring design firms are busy 
hiring designers in mass numbers. IBM, which increasingly positions 
itself as a design and innovation consultancy backed by scalable 
enterprise software and technology solutions, famously announced in 
2015 that it was hiring 1000 designers in an effort to become the largest 
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source of in-house designers in the world and to “generate much better 
outcomes for [their] customers” (Paul, 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 13: Mergers & Acquisitions of Design Firms 
Timeline of mergers and acquisition activity of design firms categorized by year and 
nature of the acquiring company (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 2016). 
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Figure 14: Timeline of Mergers & Acquisitions of Design Firms 
Timeline of mergers and acquisition activity of design firms categorized by year, 
acquiring company, and acquired company (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 2016). 
 
 
On the surface, there is much reason for optimism here. This pattern 
represents the possibility that the broader business community is 
developing an appreciation and understanding of the power of design-
led approaches. This possibility is supported by the rise of design-
related executive roles within companies. Whereas traditionally 
designers in industry have reported to technical and engineering 
managers, over ten percent of Fortune-listed companies now have 
executive-level design positions (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 
2016). 
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While this is encouraging, there is reason for concern. As design 
capabilities move in house, it becomes more difficult for external 
consultancies to sell their services as they find themselves competing 
for work with clients who now have their own, wholly controlled 
resources without the markup or expense of a consulting firm. All of 
this raises the question of how the internalization of design firms into 
bigger consulting, technology, or financial services organizations will 
affect their abilities to pursue problem-finding and the design process 
with the effectiveness they had as external vendors. If one of the 
primary reasons that external design-led innovation consultancies have 
been effective in moving clients to produce more successful innovations 
is that they are not fully and directly subject to pressures and forces of 
what happens inside an organization that tend to erode the ability to 
pursue projects with a generative, explorative design process that 
utilizes problem-finding. On the inside, it is easy to imagine that the 
design-led innovation group must now serve the business units in a way 
that legitimizes their funding and, therefore existence. The difference 
here from being an external firm is that the internal firm may not have 
a choice to pursue alternative clients. When these pressures are in 
place, the willingness to agree or conform to certain project demands 
from the business, despite their implications for the rigour or depth of 
design tools used. Furthermore, there are significant issues with 
regards to the design-led innovation firm’s ability to attract the talent it 
once did; arguably its greatest resource.  
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Meanwhile, there are indications of new models and types of firms that 
are emerging. Larger firms with the available resources have moved 
into the world of “venture design” (Fabricant, 2014), a pattern which 
has spilled over from the consulting industry into the venture capital 
sector. IDEO and Frog Design have both launched venture arms where 
they invest their consulting services in a company in exchange for an 
equity stake and / or royalty in that company. Designer Yves Behar’s 
firm, Fuseproject, operated on a similar model, accepting applications 
for three to five startups each year to work with in exchange for equity 
and / or royalties. In 2014, Chinese marketing firm BlueFocus invested 
$46.7M in Behar’s firm in exchange for a 75% equity stake 
(Fehrenbacher, 2014).  
 
The combination of these patterns, identified at a macro level through 
the literature review, point to potential implications for organizations 
pursuing innovation and for design practitioners consulting to those 
organizations. These implications are explored at a practitioner and 
organizational level in the following sections.  
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4.0 Tensions: The Practitioner Lens  
In this section, insights from the autoethnographic study are 
summarized according to a thematic analysis (McCurdy, Spradley, & 
Shandy, 2005). They are presented as design tensions, representative of 
the conflicting needs between stakeholders in the system and the 
expression of the gap between current and some desired state. Design 
tensions can be defined as the identification of “not a problem or a 
solution, but rather a limited resource or choice across one or more 
criteria. Design tensions help us search the situation for channel 
factors, the few crucial emergent configurations that may make or 
break a system” (Tatar, 2007).  
 
4.1 Tension 1: Practitioner pressure 
Tension: practitioners’ skill sets vs. scope of work in contract 
 
Design and innovation practitioners within consultancies can often feel 
that their skill sets are at odds with the nature of the work that is 
scoped in innovation projects. Increasingly, design research and 
innovation practitioners - because of their extensive training and 
multidisciplinary backgrounds - possess a deep knowledge of, and 
ability to leverage, methods that aid in the problem-finding process, but 
that aren’t included in the suite of popularized rapid innovation and 
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prototyping methods. The tendency for companies to demand 
innovation consulting services that serve core innovation efforts fail to 
activate and put to use these skills, leaving practitioners longing for the 
desire to leverage the full extent of their innovation skillsets. Because 
the negotiation of scope and contracting is often done prior to the 
engagement of staffed team, this can leave the practitioner feeling as if 
they have little agency in applying their expertise in the most suitable, 
effective way for the project’s needs.  
 
4.2 Tension 2: Client dissonance in innovation 
needs 
 
Tension: clients want tangible immediate results, but also 
breakthrough innovation  
 
Client organizations aren’t always conscious of the need for or value of 
problem-finding. Client organizations often come to consultancies with 
solutions in mind. Hypotheses of ways for solving a specific business 
problem are tangible, immediate, and scope-able, further driving the 
popularization of rapid innovation methods that solve relatively core 
innovation challenges instead of higher-ambition innovations. The 
distinction between these is illustrated in the Innovation Ambition 
Matrix in Figure 12 (Tuff & Nagji, 2012). 
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Figure 15: Innovation Ambition Matrix 
The Innovation Ambition Matrix provides a way for categorizing innovation initiatives 
based on how far away an innovation is from an organization’s current assets and 
markets (Tuff & Nagji, 2012). 
 
 
Often times, even when a client is conscious of the need for and value of 
problem finding, the organization either doesn’t possess the capabilities 
or knowledge to pursue it, or incentives and pressures within the 
organization lead clients to opt for core innovation projects with faster 
delivery, clearly defined deliverables, and known outcomes. The 
research revealed that this tension - between clients needing immediate 
solutions with near-term results and also desiring long-term 
breakthrough innovation - often resulted in significant practitioner 
stress as scoping, alignment, and problem frames are negotiated. This 
tension, then, was felt in multiple ways: between the client and 
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consultancy in the form of scope negotiations, between the practitioner 
and the consultancy in the form of alignment of values and methods 
selection, and between practitioner and the client when work 
commences and is misaligned based on the practitioner’s skills and 
knowledge of the problem-finding activities they felt were required.  
 
4.3 Tension 3: Pushing, to a limit  
Tension: practitioners want to push clients to do more, but fear 
risking the business & relationship  
 
Throughout the autoethnographic research, several cases were 
identified where practitioners expressed a desire to ‘push’ or persuade 
the client to re-frame their challenge as higher-ambition than when 
originally presented to the consultancy as a potential engagement. 
While these conversations do sometimes take place, they are often 
associated with feelings of concern and risk avoidance as practitioners 
fear losing the relationship or business altogether. This tension became 
more prevalent as sales and negotiations situations became more high-
stakes. Throughout the research, this was observed in particular during 
the following types of events: engagements involving key clients, deals 
where multiple senior executives were involved, accounts with 
significant social visibility, and in particularly slow times of the 
business where increased pressure existed to drive utilization metrics.  
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4.4 - Tension 4: Predictability and stability  
Tension: problem finding means letting insights and problem spaces 
emerge, but traditional consulting contracting requires clear work 
plans, outputs, and deliverables 
 
Even in situations where both parties - client organization and 
consultancy - expressed a desire to pursue innovation projects that 
included problem-finding activities, there often appeared to be a 
stumbling point when it came time to agree on the terms and nature of 
the work. As conversations progressed, for example, clients frequently 
start to ask more poignant questions around deliverables, milestones, 
and outputs. That is, despite their deep desire to pursue longer-term 
innovation, their frame of reference was only that of how core 
innovation projects worked - often characterized and shaped by their 
prior experiences with rapid innovation and prototyping methods. This 
mental model appeared to be in direct conflict with their inherent 
knowledge of the need to pursue a different kind of work with different 
methods and tools. As a result, the consulting practitioner, who 
expresses a deep desire to leverage their tools and skillset around 
generative research and problem-finding, often struggles to find ways 
to instill confidence in the client that these are the right activities. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with the emergent nature of 
true problem-finding activities also represented a certain degree of risk 
for the consultancy, with a lesser ability to forecast key business metrics 
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such as future billings, utilization, and resourcing needs. At an 
emotional level, this uncertainty about the work required also 
introduces a sense of anxiety, as the consultant, in a way, feels as if they 
may be signing up for a project that might ultimately fall outside of 
their direct skills or expertise area. This notion, of committing to 
solving a problem that is yet to be defined or even named, can be 
particularly stress-inducing for traditional management and technology 
consultancies which have become successful over many decades in part 
due to their hypotheses-led approaches.  
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5.0 Systems Dynamics: The client 
organization lens  
To better understand the above-described practitioner tensions within 
the broader context of the client organization, a systems thinking 
approach was utilized in an effort to identify leverage points and 
dynamics within corporate innovation approaches and how they are 
decided upon by managers, executives, and their firms.  
 
5.1 The Innovation Ambition Matrix  
Before reviewing the systemic view of corporate innovation decisions 
within organizations, it is helpful to define and categorize the choices 
available to executives and managers when it comes to innovation 
decisions. One tool for doing so is The Innovation Ambition Matrix 
(Tuff & Nagji, 2012), (an adaptation of The Ansoff Matrix (Ansoff, 
1958)), a framework developed by management consultancy Monitor 
Group to help companies classify levels of innovation ambition and 
allocate investments effectively across those levels. See Figure 13.  
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Figure 16: Innovation Ambition Matrix (II) 
 
 
The Innovation Ambition Matrix provides a way for categorizing “the 
novelty of a company’s offerings (on the x axis) and the novelty of its 
customer markets (on the y axis).” These categories - core, adjacent, 
and transformational - are overlaid as “three levels of distance from the 
company’s current, bottom-left reality.” Adjacent and transformational 
innovations are also referred to as higher-ambition innovations in this 
paper (Tuff & Nagji, 2012).  
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The further along each axis, the greater the need for exploratory, 
generative design research. This is the case because each successive 
level of ambition implies increased uncertainty - as it is further away 
from the core business. The greater the gap between the markets the 
organization currently serves / the products the organization currently 
offers and the markets/products of the intended innovation effort, the 
more is to be learned, discovered, and designed.  
 
In the case of a core product extension, [traditional market] 
insight is usually sufficient: Customers can say whether they 
would like a proposed product variant and, if so, how much 
they’d be willing to pay for it. However, if the innovation 
initiative involves an entirely new solution—one that customers 
may not even know they need—traditional processes are 
dangerous. It’s impossible to predict fifth-year sales for 
something the world has never seen before. The process is very 
different for transformational innovation. Here the challenge is 
to take a small number of possibly game-changing ideas and 
ensure that they emerge from the pipeline stronger. A company 
must spend sufficient time up front exploring what’s possible, 
constantly expanding the options available in pursuit of the right 
big idea. In other words, transformational efforts are not 
generally managed with a funnel approach; they require a 
nonlinear process in which potential alternatives remain 
undefined for a long period of time. This is another reason why a 
stage-gate process is so lethal to transformational innovation: It 
results in the rejection of promising options before they are 
properly explored (Nagji & Tuff, 2012).  
 
Nagji & Tuff’s research suggests that different innovation processes are 
more appropriate for different levels of innovation ambition - core and 
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higher-ambition. When considering the differences between Kumar’s 
innovation process, which starts with contextual design research, and 
Google Ventures’ Design Sprints model, which foregoes design research 
to instead begin by ideating and testing rapid prototypes, there is a 
connection to Tuff & Nagji’s analysis. The analysis implies that rapid 
innovation processes may be effective in producing core innovations, 
but design research-led processes are more effective in pursuing 
higher-ambition innovations.  
 
Furthermore, Tuff & Nagji provide a quantitative analysis of the 
financial benefits of investing in core, adjacent, and higher-ambition 
innovations: “Core innovation efforts typically contribute 10% of the 
long-term, cumulative return on innovation investment; adjacent 
initiatives contribute 20%; and transformational efforts contribute 
70%” (Tuff & Nagji, 2012).  
 
One interesting insight offered by the Innovation Ambition Matrix is 
that because higher-ambition innovations require moving away from 
what the business currently does today through serving new markets or 
customers (along the y-axis) and developing new offerings (along the x-
axis), it is then implied that a greater investment is required in those 
innovation initiatives. Aside from the time needed to conduct design 
research at the forefront of higher-ambition projects, the very nature of 
the organizations doing something new means that to execute that 
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innovation project an investment in new capabilities is required. A 
capability can be defined as “the expression or the articulation of the 
capacity, materials, and expertise an organization needs in order to 
perform core functions” (Rouse, 2011).  
 
The understanding of innovation choices provided by the Innovation 
Ambition Matrix begs the questions, then: if the financial returns of 
higher-ambition innovations are so much greater than core 
innovations, why are rapid innovation processes that begin with 
hypotheses and iterative testing becoming so popular? And why are 
companies opting for these processes given the notion that higher-
ambition innovations with greater returns require not fast, solution-led 
sprints, but explorative design research-led processes that begin with 
questions and problem-finding? How might this be connected to the 
required investment in new capabilities?  
 
With these questions in mind, and clearly defined concepts of core vs. 
higher-ambition innovation, the following section attempts to explain 
organizations’ innovation investment decisions through a systems 
design lens.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 70 
5.2 The Improvement Paradox   
In 2002 MIT system dynamics and organization studies researchers 
Nelson Repenning and John Sterman conducted observations, 
interviews, examinations of project documentation, and quantitative 
metrics to study the choices that managers face when it comes to 
making decisions about investing in new capabilities, or simply 
improving existing ones. Repenning & Sterman’s model of the 
“improvement paradox” can be used to draw analogous insights about 
how investments get made in core innovation or innovations that 
require problem-finding (Repenning & Sterman, 2002). Similar to the 
literature review conducted for this project - particularly in Pattern 1: 
Fast Design - their research identified that the number of tools and 
resources available to companies is growing rapidly. Despite this, they 
also identified that companies frequently make decisions to forego 
investments in new capabilities and instead deploy known methods to 
improve existing efforts. As with the insights identified in the 
autoethnographic study, what Repenning and Sterman’s investigation 
determined is that the reasons these types of decisions get made has 
more to do with “how the introduction of a new program interacts with 
the physical, economic, social, and psychological structures” 
(Repenning & Sterman, 2002), which in part can be represented 
through a series of causal loop system diagrams, depicted in Figure 14.  
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Figure 17: The Improvement Paradox 
The Improvement Paradox (Repenning & Sterman, 2002).   
 
 
At the heart of Repenning & Sterman’s model is the idea that to 
increase company performance in order to close a given Performance 
Gap, there are two options available: increase time spent working to do 
more of what is currently done (shown as Work Harder), or invest in 
capabilities by spending time on improvements (shown as Work 
Smarter). Work Smarter increases the flow into new capabilities, but 
with the finite resources available in any given company, these 
improvements require taking resources away from time spent Working 
Harder. This is indicated by the connection between the Performance 
Gap, which increases Pressure to Do Work, thereby decreasing Time 
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Spent on Improvements of capabilities and increasing Time Spent 
Working Harder.  
 
5.3 The Core Innovation Trap  
In this section, I will show how Tuff & Nagji’s Innovation Ambition 
Matrix aligns to Repenning & Sterman’s Improvement Paradox Model. 
Furthermore, this section will integrate these complementary 
perspectives, using the Improvement Paradox Model as an analogy for 
Innovation Ambition and introducing the Core Innovation Trap, in 
which the systems dynamics at play behind organizations’ decisions on 
rapid innovation processes instead of design-led problem-finding 
processes can be better understood.  
 
First, the connections between the Innovation Ambition Matrix and the 
Improvement Paradox Model must be drawn.  Higher-ambition 
innovations require at least one of entering a new market or developing 
products and assets through new capabilities. This notion of capability 
investment being a criterion for consideration as higher-ambition 
means parallels can be drawn to the system dynamics outlined in the 
Improvement Paradox Model, which draws attention to the tradeoffs 
between Working Smarter (akin to investing in capabilities, or higher-
ambition innovation) and Working Harder (akin to doing more within 
the constraints of current capabilities, or core innovation). As such, the 
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analysis in the remainder of this section will assume these definitions to 
be equal. These assumptions of equivalent concepts between 
Repenning & Sterman’s Improvement Paradox Model and Tuff & 
Nagji’s Innovation Ambition Matrix are mapped in Table 2.  
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Concept from the 
Improvement Paradox 
(Repenning & Sterman) 
Concept from the 
Innovation Ambition  
(Tuff & Nagji) 
Rationale for Equivalency  
Work Harder Core Innovation Repenning & Sterman’s model 
indicates that the balancing loop 
Work Harder does not include any 
investment or impact on capabilities.  
 
Further, Tuff & Nagji’s Innovation 
Ambition Matrix suggests that Core 
Innovations are those that leverage 
existing capabilities by participating 
in current markets and leveraging 
existing products & assets 
Work Smarter Higher-Ambition Innovation (Core 
and Adjacent) Repenning & Sterman’s model indicates that the balancing loop 
Work Smarter does, in fact, include 
investment in capabilities.  
 
Further, Tuff & Nagji’s Innovation 
Ambition Matrix suggests that 
Adjacent and Higher-Ambition 
Innovations are those that require 
investment in capabilities by 
participating in new markets and 
leveraging new products & assets. 
Time Spent on Improvement Design Research-Led Problem-
Finding Innovation Processes If the above assumptions about Work Smarter are held true, in that these 
initiatives require an investment in 
capabilities, and that innovation 
initiatives which require capability 
investments are considered higher-
ambition innovations, then Tuff & 
Nagji’s analysis would suggest that 
these innovations require design 
research-led problem-finding 
innovation processes in order to be 
effective.  
Time Spent Working Rapid Innovation, Hypothesis-Led 
Processes If the above assumptions about Work Harder are held true, in that these 
initiatives do not require an 
investment in capabilities, and that 
innovation initiatives which do not 
require capability investments are 
considered core innovations, then 
Tuff & Nagji’s analysis would suggest 
that these innovations can be 
executed using rapid innovation, 
hypothesis-led processes to be 
effective.   
 
Table 3: Analogous Concepts between the Improvement Paradox and the 
Innovation Ambition Matrix 
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With these equivalencies established between the Improvement 
Paradox and Innovation Ambition Matrix, Figure 15 depicts a revised 
version of Repenning & Sterman’s system map, herein referred to as 
The Ambition Dilemma, which introduces new language consistent 
with the innovation processes and theories discussed in this paper. 
Notably, The Ambition Dilemma introduces what will be referred to as 
the Core Innovation Trap (depicted as B1), where the rise in popularity 
of rapid innovation processes, as explained in Pattern 1 - Faster Design 
contributes to core innovations which, over the long term, fail to 
address the structural issues underlying the markets an organization 
serves. The Core Innovation Trap will be explained in detail in the 
following section.  
 
Additionally, The Ambition Dilemma reflects another significant 
finding identified in the literature review in that it includes the 
implications of Pattern 2 - Bigger Problems. Here, the increasing scale, 
urgency, and interconnectedness of complex problems - combined with 
the rapid pace at which these problems are advancing - further 
increases capability erosion of organizations, as their current stock of 
capabilities becomes less relevant when compared to the problems that 
require solving.   
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Figure 18: The Ambition Dilemma 
An adapted model of the Improvement Paradox, introducing new terminology and 
language consistent with the Innovation Ambition Matrix based on the equivalencies 
in Table 2. Of particular focus for this project is the introduction of the Core 
Innovation Trap (B2), explained in the following section.  
 
 
Of particular interest in The Ambition Dilemma and Core Innovation 
Trap is the identification of delays and incentives in the system which 
may explain the decisions organizations make about their investments 
across innovation ambition levels.  
 
Any investment in higher-ambition innovation and, therefore, 
problem-finding innovation processes, translates to the experience of a 
delay before benefits are realized and the impacts of capability 
improvement are felt. The benefits of higher-ambition innovation and 
capability investment tend to be lasting and of significant benefit, but 
as explained by Tuff & Nagji, require significantly different innovation 
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processes than core innovations. “It takes time to uncover the root 
causes of problems and then to discover, test, and implement 
solutions,” say Repenning & Sterman, “shown in the diagram as a delay 
between improvement activities and the resulting change in process 
capability”.  
 
Contrast this delay with what happens when an organization increases 
their investment in core innovations. The organization receives 
immediate benefit, albeit not through capability investment, but in a 
way that helps to address the current pains of needing to increase 
company performance.  
 
Driving investments in either of these options - doing more core 
innovation through rapid processes or building new capabilities 
through problem-finding processes - is the gap between the company’s 
current performance and desired performance. Desired performance is 
a factor of where the company’s performance stands in comparison to 
factors such as internal growth plans and forecasts, but also changing 
expectations of customers, market forces, or regulations. Given the 
rapid pace of change in today’s society and economy, this system driver, 
labeled as Bigger Problems (Pattern 1), is accelerating and placing more 
pressure on companies as it continually and more significantly 
increases the Performance Gap (Reeves & Pueschel, 2015). As this 
pressure increases, so does the firm’s sense of urgency to quickly 
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increase performance in an effort to close this gap, which drives more 
core innovation and rapid processes.  
 
Here, it becomes possible to understand why the popularization of 
rapid innovation methods, as described in Pattern 1 - Fast Design, has 
taken root so quickly. In an era of rapid change and a company’s 
contextual landscape continually shifting and increasing the 
Performance Gap, providing an incentive for managers to pursue ‘quick 
hit’ innovation, any inclination to pursue the time-consuming activities 
involved in true problem-finding is therefore dis-incentivized - as these 
involve investments in new capabilities and results which may not 
immediately close the performance gap. That is to say that “while 
investments in capability might eventually yield large and enduring 
[innovations], they do little to solve the problems managers face right 
now.” (Repenning & Sterman, 2001).  
 
While the investment in core innovation quickly improves performance 
and closes the Performance Gap, the key in the system diagram is that 
core innovation does not ever improve capabilities, which are 
continually eroding as they become outdated and outpaced by market 
changes, general technological improvements, and in relative value 
when compared to the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of 
problems requiring solving.  
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Over time, these eroding capabilities work to decrease performance of 
the organization, widening the Performance Gap, and even further 
increasing the pressure for managers to invest in core innovation to 
quickly improve results.  
 
This balancing loop is the Core Innovation Trap and it works in a 
viscous cycle to incentivize and encourage companies to adopt methods 
that lead to faster, accelerated cycles of incremental improvement to 
existing offerings. To demonstrate the consequences of the Core 
Innovation Trap to the health of companies’ innovation portfolios, a 
view of the 2012 study on how companies manage innovation 
investments across different levels of ambition is relevant. Tuff & Nagji 
tell the story of a consumer products company which continually 
pursued core innovation and fell into The Core Innovation Trap: 
 
Take the example of a consumer goods company we know. 
Attuned to the need to keep its brands fresh in retailers’ and 
consumers’ minds, it introduced frequent improvements and 
variations on its core offerings. Most of those earned their keep 
with respectable uptake by the market and decent margins. Over 
time, however, it became clear that all this product proliferation, 
while splitting the revenue pie into ever-smaller slices, wasn’t 
actually growing the pie. (Tuff & Nagji, 2012) 
 
 
One may wonder why managers don’t employ these rapid innovation 
techniques only to course-correct when new performance gaps occur, 
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reinvesting in capability-building efforts for long-term growth once the 
gap is closed. In the experience I mentioned in the introduction to this 
paper, this was also part of my hypothesis - that closing the gap through 
a series of short-term rapid innovation projects would help our client 
reach market ‘parity’ and, then, there would be opportunity to pursue 
the bigger, higher-ambition opportunities which would call for true 
problem-finding and framing activities at the outset of those initiatives.  
 
This rarely occurs, however; and this observation by Repenning & 
Sterman echoes many the tensions which surfaced as a result of the 
autoethnographic research.  
 
Instead, what we repeatedly observe, and what is more difficult to 
understand, are organizations in which [core innovation] is not 
merely a means to deal with isolated incidents, but is instead standard 
operating procedure… What starts as a temporary emphasis on 
working harder quickly becomes routine” (Repenning and Sterman, 
2002).  
 
While this is discouraging for the use of problem-finding processes to 
achieve higher-ambition innovation within organizations, there is hope. 
Repenning and Sterman have identified that when a temporary 
emphasis is placed on one option - either core innovation or higher-
ambition capability building - that option is likely to become the norm, 
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entering a reinforcing loop that self-sustains. Theoretically, just as the 
above-described loop that drives a vicious cycle in the Core Innovation 
Trap of B1, investments in higher-ambition capability building will, 
over time, see higher growth at a sustained level that improves 
productivity and returns of investments, and makes available more 
resources to be reinvested back into additional innovation projects, as 
seen in B2 and R1. Citing the quantitative analysis of Tuff & Nagji on 
the financial returns on investments across different levels of 
innovation ambition, the possibility of this higher-ambition innovation 
cycle, and corresponding reinvestment, is further supported by the 
significantly higher proportion of bottom-line gains produced by 
adjacent and transformational efforts; 20% and 70%, respectively, 
compared to just 10% for core innovations.  
 
While this higher-ambition reinforcing loop is possible in theory, it is 
important to note that one of the key differences between the problem-
finding processes of higher-ambition innovations and the rapid 
processes of core innovations is the presence of a significant system 
delay between flows into new capabilities and the time at which 
benefits are realized. This delay is a significant driver of the decisions 
that firms make about what type of innovation projects to pursue and 
how, a finding that was reinforced in the autoethnographic research 
and spanning across all four identified Tensions.  
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This can be wishful thinking, however. Consider that the delay that 
exists between the investments in higher-ambition innovations and the 
time to realize benefits from those new capabilities also applies in 
reverse. Just like the delay exists between investing in the higher-
ambition innovation and realizing the benefits, the delay also exists 
between not investing in higher-ambition innovation and feeling the 
effects of eroding capabilities. That is, companies can pull investments 
from higher-ambition budgets and reallocate those resources into core 
innovations without feeling any negative consequences in the short-
term while those capabilities take time to erode.  This is the Shortcuts 
cycle, depicted as B3. The Shortcuts cycle is further reinforced by the 
fact that, while capabilities erode, several core innovation projects may 
occur. In that time, not only is there no pain from reducing higher-
ambition investments, there is actually net gain as the benefits from 
core innovations are felt. As a result, organizations make decisions to 
scale back from higher-ambition investments frequently, at the expense 
of the long-term health of the company’s innovation pipeline.  
 
In summary  
 
●   The Innovation Ambition Matrix provides a way to categorize 
innovations based on the level of uncertainty and requirement for 
investment in new capabilities. These levels are core and higher-
ambition (adjacent + transformational). Core and higher-ambition 
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innovation projects require different innovation processes; while 
core innovation can benefit from rapid processes, higher-ambition 
innovation relies on problem-finding activities to help navigate 
uncertainty.  
●   The Improvement Paradox provides an analogous system to 
help shape an understanding of how managers, executives, and 
firms make decisions to invest in core innovation or higher-
ambition innovation.  
●   Combining concepts from the Innovation Ambition Matrix and 
the Improvement Paradox give us a new model, the Ambition 
Dilemma. Within this model, a balancing loop called the Core 
Innovation Trap can create a vicious cycle in which 
organization continue to make core innovation investments to 
relieve the business of present performance gaps, and underinvest 
in higher-ambition innovations, largely because of the delay 
between initial investment and realization of benefits.  
 
In the following section, this paper will leverage the learnings of the 
literature scan, autoethnographic research, and system map to develop 
a set of design principles and insights intended to act as a springboard 
for generating solution sets.  
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6.0 Areas of intervention  
6.1 Design principles 
This research project set out to provide insights into the questions: 
What factors might influence the way large organizations pursue 
meaningful innovation? How do decisions get made with respect to 
ambition and long-term investments in new capabilities and growth 
opportunities? And how do design-led consultancies overcome those 
barriers to drive better innovations with clients?  
 
By better understanding the lived experiences of consulting 
practitioners and the systems dynamics at play behind innovation 
decisions within client organizations, the following principles emerged 
from the research for how design-led innovation consultancies might 
better enable higher-ambition innovations through problem-finding 
processes. Design principles are a tool to “purposefully transition from 
the insights that we have framed to begin to explore concepts in a 
disciplined manner, so that concepts we develop are fully grounded in 
objective research data rather than biased by subjective assumptions” 
(Kumar, 2013). 
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The design principles are: 
 
Improve and increase sensing - Managers often make decisions 
based solely on their view of the situation, responding to the pressures 
and incentives put in place around the performance of the business in 
the near-term, without understanding the context of where those 
particular pressures are coming from and what the underlying forces 
might be. Any solution set should give managers a way to see beyond 
just their own immediate symptoms to understand (i) how forces are 
driving the erosion of capabilities and (ii) create a new reference point 
for what is urgent and prioritized when it comes to investing in 
initiatives of different ambitions.  
 
Reduce delays - As described by Repenning & Sterman and Nagji & 
Tuff, one of the leading reasons managers fail to invest in long-term, 
higher-ambition innovation initiatives is that the return on innovation 
is unclear when it comes to timing and payback periods. The Ambition 
Dilemma points to the delay that occurs between an initial investment 
in new capabilities and when that improved capability actually 
increases the performance of the business. Interventions developed 
might take into consideration how to reduce these delays or, introduce 
new leverage points that help ease or overcome this delay through 
buffers. Taking the opposite approach, a solution might consider 
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introducing a delay in how managers and executives experience the 
rewards of core innovation - making the relative comparison of 
investing in core or higher-ambition initiatives more favourable for 
long-term projects which ultimately lead to higher returns.  
 
Re-align values & incentives - For design-led innovation 
consultancies, the pressures of utilization and billable hours lead to 
higher-than-desired acceptance of engagements that involve core 
innovation work, despite practitioners’ true interest in doing work 
centred in higher-ambition methods such as problem-finding. That is 
to say that the pressures found within the client organization which 
lead to over-investment in core initiatives, are unfortunately aligned 
with the pressures within the consulting organization to sell new work 
and keep resources staffed on billable projects. Just like it is easier and 
more pressing for client organizations to fix the ‘now’, so is the case 
within the consultancy. This alignment of stakeholder needs actually 
leads to a reinforcing loop which drives more and more core innovation 
work. Re-aligning the values and incentives at play here so that one or 
both sides have an incentive to drive towards higher-ambition work 
might lead to better problem-finding activities and outcomes.  
 
Focus on the human behaviours and decisions - Most of the 
literature refers to under-performing innovation investments as an 
‘organizational’ problem. As seen in the autoethnographic experience 
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audit, however, this is a very human problem whereby the behaviours 
and decisions of individual actors within the system ultimately add up 
to both client organization and consultancy pursuing core-innovation 
too often. Solutions developed should take this into consideration, 
thinking through how the intervention will lead to better personal 
decision-making around innovation at a manager, executive, 
practitioner, and consulting firm leadership level.   
 
De-risk innovations - Over and above the delays in returns on 
investment in higher-ambition innovation projects is the sheer 
uncertainty of returns at all. As Nagji & Tuff point out, the problem-
finding activities introduced in higher-ambition innovation initiatives 
often imply that deliverables, outputs, capabilities, resources, and 
business models can all be uncertain and emergent throughout a long 
process. While Nagji & Tuff suggest one method of de-risking 
innovation at a portfolio level, through a balanced mix of innovation 
initiatives across ambition levels, other solutions might take into 
consideration other ways to effectively de-risk innovations at a project 
basis. This is especially important given the design principle of human 
behaviours and decisions as it is likely that many managers and 
executives won’t be working at a portfolio level, and therefore do not 
benefit from the hedging of the balanced mix of initiatives. 
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6.2 Framing interventions 
With these design principles in mind, a list of opportunity areas was 
generated in the form of “How might we?” questions. Coming back to 
the original research questions and problem frame, these How Might 
We questions are intended to find ways in which design led 
consultancies might help client organizations produce better problem-
finding outcomes (Stanford d.school, n.d.).  
 
How might we reduce the delay in benefits realization when investing 
in higher-ambition innovation that stems from problem-finding 
processes?  
 
How might we increase the tangibility of capability investments - 
making the benefits feel as real and rewarding - or more real and 
rewarding - as improving the core business?  
 
How might we increase the rewards and incentives for investing in 
long-term innovation and problem-finding? How might we reduce the 
rewards and incentives associated with core innovation? 
 
How might we increase the sensing capabilities of client organizations 
in an effort to help executives and managers see beyond the current 
business?  
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How might we reduce the risk and uncertainty - and perception of risk 
and uncertainty - related to investments in higher-ambition 
innovations and capabilities?  
 
How might we allow client organizations to pursue a balance of 
innovations that simultaneously pursue core innovation and higher-
ambition innovation so that temporary shortcuts don’t turn into 
permanent behaviours?  
 
How might we increase the awareness of the implications of the 
tradeoffs of short-term vs long-term innovation to shift the mental 
models of executives and managers?  
 
How might we ease the short-term pains of the transition that occurs 
when resources are reallocated from short-term core innovation 
projects to long-term higher-ambition projects?  
 
How might we re-allocate the risks associated with higher-ambition 
innovation across client and consultant?  
 
How might we align the incentives and values of the client 
organization and consultant to pursue higher-ambition innovation?  
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While contemplating these questions, two attributes overwhelmingly 
emerged that helped characterize the dimensions by which future 
solutions might take shape. These attributes, informed by the research, 
represent what appear to be the most significant and uncertain 
strategic uncertainties for how design-led consultancies of the future 
reorient themselves to drive better problem-finding outcomes. 
 
6.3 Y-Axis: What will be the consultancy’s unit of 
focus?  
Throughout the autoethnographic research it was observed that the 
process of problem-finding and framing, if employed at all, occurs once 
a client is already or nearly secured and the work has commenced in 
earnest. It is at this crucial stage where challenges begin as pressures of 
project timing, scope, and client risk tolerance begins to impact the 
methods and activities that take place. This is often the time where 
tensions between methods and project economics are felt the most.  
 
When global design consultancy IDEO announced their acquisition by 
Japanese conglomerate Kyu 2016, they cited the nature of problem-
finding and their desire to pursue bigger and more complex challenges. 
In a blog post titled “The Next Big Thing in Design” which announced 
the acquisition, CEO Tim Brown discusses the role of external, 
  
 
 91 
independent design firms as being able to start an engagement with 
problem-finding, as opposed to beginning with solutions. This tension 
Brown describes strikes similarity to the patterns identified in the 
literature review: between the popularization of rapid approaches and 
the need to solve increasingly complex problems (Brown, 2016):  
 
You see, even when you have a pack of designers roaming your 
halls, it’s hard for analytical cultures to integrate creative ones. 
The reason being that analytical cultures traditionally start with 
an answer, and then break the problem down into its constituent 
parts, whereas creative cultures start with questions and look at 
problems holistically. From the very beginning, IDEO has been a 
culture that starts with questions. It’s the only way we know how 
to uncover pressing human needs and design toward them. 
That’s at our core. But for us, those questions can’t be limited to 
digital experiences. We’ve been working on those for 30 years, 
and our hunch is that they’ve reached a “peak design” moment. 
That’s not to suggest that digital experiences are unimportant or 
can’t get any better, but simply that they’ve become 
commoditized at this point. It’s time to apply our collective 
design practice to greater challenges, namely:  
1. Serving the needs of the global poor 
2. Designing new approaches to health, including aging and the 
end of life 
3. Designing healthy and profitable food systems that can serve 
the needs of all 
4. Designing citizen-centered government services 
5. Designing the future of our urban communities 
6. Anticipating the opportunities and challenges of over-the-
horizon technologies 
7. Designing the future of work and the corporation itself 
 
Those are the edges of design and it’s where we feel a 
gravitational pull (Brown, 2016). 
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Brown’s post suggests that, in response to the commodification of 
design tools for core problems and the need for designers and design 
firms to be focused on the increasingly complex problems facing 
society, they must turn their attention to specific problems with intent 
and purpose. 
 
This insight forms the basis for the Y-axis of the 2x2: whether the 
design-led consultancy of the future will be client-focused or problem-
focused, as Brown signals. Client-focused consultancies, on the other 
hand, will be defined as serving the specific needs of a client and the 
problem they bring to an engagement - much like how consultancies 
operate today. It is important to note here that these two configurations 
- client-focused and problem-focused - may not be entirely mutually 
exclusive.  
 
The axis is intended to represent the primary focus of the consultancy. 
Is the consultancy focused primarily on finding and solving problems in 
a system, agnostic to who the end client may be? Or is the consultancy 
focused primarily on meeting the needs of a client, and willing to 
approach, for the most part, any given problem that client may be 
interested in solving?  
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This y-axis is represented with the following end points: 
 
 
Figure 19: Y-Axis - Focus of the Design-Led Consultancy 
The y-axis: what will be the primary focus of the design-led consultancy?    
 
 
  
  
 
 94 
6.4 X-Axis: How will the consultancy align to risk?  
Throughout the research, one of the recurring themes was the concept 
of risk and uncertainty and the possibility of the design-led consultancy 
acting as a barrier, distributor, or load-balancer of sorts to 
organizations when investing in higher-ambition innovations. Because 
of the large investment, complexity, new capabilities required, and 
duration of delay between spend and return, companies are often 
unable to come to terms with pursuing higher-ambition innovation 
which requires problem-finding - especially when compared to 
allocating that investment in core innovations with a much higher 
degree of certainty and faster payback periods.  
 
In the literature review, it was found that multiple design firms 
experimenting with business models are pursuing revenue streams 
whereby they place fees at risk. In this manner, they effectively share 
the risk of an innovation project, while also sharing in the returns on 
investment. Namely, Frog Design, IDEO, and Fahrenheit 212 have 
experimented with these models, indicating emerging business models 
where the design-led consultancy makes an effort to align their 
incentives and rewards with the ultimate success of the project and, by 
doing so, alleviates some of the risk for the client or beneficiary of the 
work (Frog Ventures, n.d) (IDEO Futures, n.d) (Sniukas, 2016).  
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In the autoethnographic research, it was discovered that some of the 
most significant pain points for design-consulting practitioners occur 
because of the tension between the time / methods required to 
effectively find problems and the traditional consulting business model 
which dictates a set scope, number of hours, and deliverables at the 
outset of a project - which often fall prey to the Core Innovation Trap.  
 
Because of this significance, the X-axis represents how design-led 
consultancies will configure their business models with respect to risk 
sharing on innovation projects: 
 
The X-axis is as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 20: X-Axis – Design-Led Consultancy Acceptance of Risk 
The x-axis: how will the design-led consultancy align to risk?    
 
 
On one end, we see the traditional consultancy business model where 
fees are typically paid for services incurred, often fixed in contract 
through negotiation in the sales process and estimated by the firm in 
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terms of billable hours. In this configuration, the revenue stream 
largely leaves the risk of pursuing innovation with the client. It could be 
argued that the client decreases their risk by temporarily adding 
capabilities via the consultancy, however for the purposes of this 
project, I have considered that risk to remain fully on client 
organization. If the innovation fails, the client organization forgoes 
their investment in the project, the expected future earnings, and the 
opportunity cost incurred by not placing those resources in another 
project where a higher return on investment may have been possible. 
The consultancy, however, collects their fees as stated in the fee-based 
contractual agreement despite the outcomes of the innovation. From 
this perspective, it becomes clearer how organizations continue to make 
decisions to pursue core innovation. If the project succeeds, the 
rewards - just like the risks - again rest completely with the client. The 
consultant’s fees don’t change and payment is made. This end of the 
axis is ‘service-based fees’. 
 
On the other end of the axis is the possibility of design consultancies 
placing their fees at risk depending on outcomes of the innovation 
project, which may take form in any number of arrangements. The key 
here is that in an outcome-based arrangement risk is shared across the 
boundary of client and consultancy, reducing the degree of uncertainty 
and difficulty of moving resources from core innovation projects to 
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higher-ambition innovations. This end of the axis is represented as 
‘outcome-based fees’.  
 
The Focus-Risk Matrix 
 
 
Figure 21: The Focus vs. Risk Matrix 
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When combined, the two axes form a 2x2 matrix that allows the 
speculative generation of solution sets to be formed against the key 
attributes, represented as four quadrants.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Focus vs. Risk Quadrants 
The Focus vs. Risk Matrix quadrants. 1, 2, and 3 will be explored in this section.  
 
 
  
  
 
 99 
N/A - Client-centric and Pay-for-services 
This quadrant represents the traditional consultancy as we know it 
today, where the practitioner focuses on serving the needs of the client 
and their problems as presented by the client. Fees are based on a 
fixed-fee scheduled, and incurred as billable hours. Because this is the 
standard operating model that exists today, and where many of the 
patterns, tensions, and insights emerged from in the research, this 
project will not generate solutions in this space.  
 
1- Client-centric and Pay-for-outcomes 
In this quadrant, the project explored new configurations for a design-
led consultancy in which the consultancy continues to focus its efforts 
on the needs of clients, however instead of collecting a fee-for-service as 
traditional consultancies do, they receive fees based on outcomes and 
the success of innovations, implying a sharing of risk between client 
and consultancy.  
 
2- Problem-centric and Pay-for-services 
Instead of serving the needs of clients, consultancies pursue specific 
problems that require solving, generating revenues through a 
traditional fee-for-service business model.  
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3- Problem-centric and Pay-for-outcomes 
In this quadrant, the furthest away from today’s standard consulting 
model, consultancies seek out problems worth solving and receive 
payment for outcomes. This represents the most extreme of the 
possible configurations, pursuing the ideal process in terms of 
problem-finding activities, while also reducing the uncertainty and risk 
for the client organization. It does, however, require the largest 
transformation in capabilities and mindset for the consultancy, as will 
be explained in the possible interventions later in this paper.  
 
The following interventions explore a possible solution set in three of 
the four quadrants, exploring opportunities in each of the possible 
scenarios defined by these attributes. Because the first quadrant, 
Client-focused and Pay-for-services, represents the traditional client-
consultant interaction model known today, the interventions below 
only focus on quadrants 2, 3, and 4. Each intervention is offered with a 
description, business model implications, precursors, potential 
barriers, and the inherent level of transformation required for the 
traditional consultancy to make this transition.  
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6.5 Quadrant 1: The Client-Consultant Co-owned 
Innovation: Client-centric and Fees-for-outcomes 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Client-Centric and Fees-for-Outcomes 
 
 
Description 
The Client-Consultant Co-owned (C3) innovation model would allow 
client organizations and innovation consultancies to jointly invest in a 
new, innovative offering. For a specified period of time after the 
innovation launches, the consulting firm would manage and operate 
the new offering, including collecting a fair share of profits from the 
innovation in this initial phase. Ultimately, however, the ownership of 
the innovation would fully transfer back to the client organization to 
own and operate - and a guarantee to do so would need to be stipulated 
in the arrangement. This agreement could be accompanied by staged or 
performance-based payments at the time of transfer. Although in 
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theory this co-ownership model could be applied to core innovations, 
because of the long-term contractual nature of the relationship, the 
consulting firm and client would both see incentives to produce an 
offering which leads to significant benefits realized over the medium to 
long term, as opposed to minor benefits or core innovation 
improvements realized in the short term. Concurrently, this sharing of 
risk might allow the client organization to effectively develop a long-
term innovation - with an incentive to pursue true problem-finding - 
while still continuing their day-to-day operations and management of 
core innovations. With fixed resources within the firm, this may also 
ease the tension of the immediate shift of dollars from core innovation 
efforts into higher-ambition innovations.  
 
Business model implications 
The shift to the C3 concept has deep implications for the future design-
led consulting business model. Instead of revenue streams derived from 
billable hours and fixed fee contracts, the way that the consultancy 
would make money in this model is based on performance and 
outcomes. While, for the client, the risk shifts away from their firm 
when compared to traditional consulting models, for the consulting 
organization the opposite is true. This ‘skin-in-the-game’ approach 
requires a certain level of risk tolerance. Additionally, consulting firms 
will need to improve their own capabilities when it comes to the 
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delivery and operation of innovations. Depending on the consultancy, 
this may be a significant leap.  
 
Precursor 
Public-Private Partnerships. An increasingly popular model in the 
delivery and operation of public infrastructure projects, P3s have 
proven successful in many countries by bringing together the public 
and private sectors to align interests in the long term nature of complex 
initiatives. While the way Public-Private Partnerships are technically 
arranged can vary depending on the goals and governance structure of 
the specific project, large and complex infrastructure initiatives have 
successfully been delivered - including roads (such as the Highway 407 
in Ontario) and hospitals.   
 
Potential Barriers 
The C3 model distributes temporarily across the consultancy and client 
organization over time. This period introduces a new risk in the 
potential for the evolution of either the innovation, the client 
organization, or the consultancy over that time. If any of these variables 
change significantly over the agreed-upon time period, the client 
organization faces the possibility that the offering is no longer a 
strategic fit. This will require new types of shared governance across 
client and consultancy in a way that allows for the resolution of 
conflicts along the way.  
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For the consultancy, there is also a risk in that it may not always be 
possible to operate the new innovation as a standalone new business, 
meaning there may still be dependencies on accessing existing client 
capabilities and data, again introducing the need for new types of 
shared governance and coordination. 
 
Level of transformation required 
For the design-led consultancy, the C3 model represents an Adjacent 
innovation, whereby they adapt their current model along the x-axis of 
the Innovation Ambition Matrix to introduce the fees-for-outcomes 
model.  
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6.6 Quadrant 2: The Syndicated Problem-Finders 
Club (Problem-centric and Fees-for-services) 
 
 
Figure 24: Problem-Centric and Fees-for-Services 
 
 
Description 
In the Syndicated Problem-Finders Club (SPFC), design-led 
consultancies would proactively pursue problem-finding activities in 
order to determine an area or areas of interest where a problem is 
deemed worth solving. By foregoing the traditional business 
development activities of first seeking out clients or responding to 
incoming requests for engagements with a specific client, the SPFC 
model prioritizes their key activities around seeking out problems. By 
changing the unit of analysis and pursuing the problem-finding process 
prior to engaging clients, consultancies can help avoid the tensions at 
play when business development activities and contractual 
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arrangements occur. In SPFC, the consultancy may not have the risk 
tolerance or capital available to align to the “Pay-for-outcomes” end of 
the x-axis in the matrix.  
 
Because many of the identified higher-order problems deemed worth 
solving may lie outside of the traditional client base where significant 
funding lies within a single client’s budget, SPFC employs a syndicate 
model. This means that once a problem is identified and framed, the 
SPFC seeks out a number of partners who may be interested in co-
funding the innovation project together. Conceptually, the SPFC 
consultancy - where they cannot accept or tolerate risk enough to move 
across the x-axis - distributes this risk amongst a broad set of partners. 
That is to say that, instead of a single client committing to a fee as the 
only funder of that work, a lower fee is paid by more funders, 
decreasing the monetary downside to any single client organization if 
the innovation were to fail.  
 
One attractive part of this future business model for the consultancy is 
the now-viable opportunities that may emerge pursuing new types of 
problems at the societal level with multiple partners. By spreading the 
fees and risk across multiple funding partners, the pursuit of these 
‘non-commercial’ problems may become more viable for the 
consultancy and these new types of client organizations than the 
traditional consultancy model.  
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This new degree of agency for consultancies to pursue higher-order 
problems, combined with a new option for shared revenue streams, 
implies that the SPFC model could significantly increase the likelihood 
that consultancies are able to approach the “wicked problems” 
(Buchanan, 1995) described by the likes of Tonkinwise and Norman (as 
identified in the literature review).  
 
The collaborative nature of the SPFC is ideal in situations where there 
are limited competitive tensions between funding partners. Here, 
public healthcare in Canada is a fitting example, where multiple 
hospitals in a single region have shared interests in solving societal 
problems. Without the shared problem-finding vehicle of the SPFC, 
these problems are likely outside of the scope of their capabilities and 
resources to pursue as a single organization. To illustrate this point is 
the simple example of a typical consulting engagement which may cost 
$1,000,000 in consulting services - a price tag likely to be significantly 
higher than any single hospital's’ budget for innovation work. Now 
consider that the same engagement is shared by multiple partners. If 10 
hospital organizations co-fund the engagement, each pays only 
$100,000 - a number far more likely to be deemed as viable. Partnering 
introduces the opportunity for those 10 hospitals to each spend 
$100,000, yet receive the benefits of that $1,000,000 engagement.  
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The economics of the SPFC model directly intervene in the Ambition 
Dilemma in a significant way. First, it contributes to removing the delay 
that occurs when organizations pursue higher-ambition innovation. By 
decreasing the total investment amount for a single organization, yet 
providing the same amount of benefit as if they were sole-funders of the 
engagement, their payback period is significantly reduced. Therefore, 
the capability only needs to improve a portion of what it would have if 
there were a much larger initial investment before the benefits of the 
innovation produce a return. That is to say that the SPFC model allows 
a much higher flow into the stock of capabilities for a much lower 
outlay of capital.  
 
The participation of multiple funders of the SPFC model, however, 
means that the innovation is not proprietary to one organization. As 
such, all of the organizations involved in the co-funding of the 
innovation project will benefit from improved capabilities of the same 
nature. This implies that capability erosion may occur faster for each 
organization as a result - if they are competitors or play the same role in 
the value chain - as new capabilities and innovations become 
commodified relatively quickly. Again, this stresses the dependency in 
this model on non-competitive or complementary organizations coming 
together as co-funders.  
 
Business model implications 
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Facilitating collaboration across interdisciplinary networks of talent 
and client groups will be a key activity introducing a new capability for 
the consultancy that pursues the SPFC model. Additionally, proactive 
design research and problem-finding activities mean incurring 
significant costs before a revenue-generating client group is involved, 
which introduces new risk and potential cash flow challenges. This 
proactive client-seeking also implies a new key activity related to 
business development where challenges are introduced in securing 
multiple clients with non-conflicting interests who are willing to fund 
an innovation project - significantly more difficult than pursuing a 
single client at a time.  
 
Precursors 
nGenera insight. A Toronto based think-tank that developed custom 
research and advisory services for a syndicated grouping of clients, 
decreasing the required spend by each individual client, but delivering 
the value of the fully-funded program in totality  
 
Vistage International. A network of business owners and chief 
executives who come together on a regular basis to share and 
collaboratively solve problems with non-competing firms. 
 
Potential barriers  
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One of the key considerations in the SPFC model will be the 
configuration and assembly of the appropriate group of funding 
partners. Given the competitive nature of the private industry, SPFC 
may need to be limited to partner arrangements where there are limited 
conflicts of interest and mutual agreements across partners. This will 
be no easy task and any consultancy interested in shifting to the SPFC 
model will need to take this into consideration. 
 
Where the implementation of any given innovation is specific to the 
organizational context of the client, this factor becomes multiplied by 
the number of partners involved. This concern around innovation 
implementation is particularly concerning given Norman’s DesignX 
(DesignX, n.d.) movement which calls for designers who work on 
complex problems to increasingly play a role in how new innovations 
actually make their way into the world. If Norman’s suggestion is 
accepted and adopted by designers of the future, the SPFC model will 
present significant challenges when it comes to implementation.  
 
 
Level of transformation required 
SPFC represents an Adjacent innovation for design-led consultancies, 
taking similar offerings today to new markets and customers.  
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6.7 Quadrant 3: The Request-for-Clients Lab 
(Problem-centric and Fees-for-outcomes)  
 
 
Figure 25: Problem-Centric and Fees-for-Outcomes 
 
 
Description 
The Request-for-Clients Lab (RFC) represents the most ambitious 
future model for the design-led consultancy. The “RFC” term here plays 
on the idea of flipping the traditional procurement process, or the 
Request for Proposals (RFP), where the consultancy responds to a 
client-framed problem and engagement. Not only does it pursue a pure 
problem-finding approach, it also accepts the highest degree of risk by 
choosing the “Pay-for-outcomes” revenue stream. In the RFC model, 
the consultancy proactively seeks out problems it deems worth solving 
before approaching a single client to transition the work into a paid 
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engagement. This quadrant introduces the unique combination of the 
consultancy continuing to be commercially focused and sharing in the 
rewards of successful innovation work. At the core of this speculation is 
the idea that the consultancy, by maintaining the agency to pursue 
effective problem-finding, produces more effective innovations that are 
especially desirable, feasible, and viable in the long-term. By pursuing 
this activity, which as described in the systems mapping portion of this 
project is quite difficult within the client organization alone, the RFC 
consultancy provides new opportunity for clients (once identified) to 
benefit from problem-finding activities without the pain or costs of 
trying to transition out of the Core Innovation Trap internally.  
Specifically, by accepting the risk of Payment-for-outcomes, the 
consultancy addresses the issue of the systems delay that occurs when 
client organizations allocate resources to higher-ambition innovation 
projects internally, where the benefits of those investments take a 
significant time to accrue and return their value. Instead, the RFC 
model insists on zero or little up-front investment resources, and relies 
on investment dollars flowing from client organization to consultancy 
only when capabilities have been developed and the outcomes and 
benefits achieved.  
 
By significantly decreasing the time between investment and return for 
the client - and, in fact reversing it - RFC introduces a new leverage 
point to effectively change the system dynamics at the core of why 
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client organizations struggle to pursue higher ambition innovations. 
RFC effectively changes the boundary of the innovation subsystem, in a 
way redrawing it to exclude higher-ambition innovation and problem-
finding processes from within the realm of the client organization - and 
placing it in the realm of the consultancy. This intervention removes 
the Ambition Dilemma, by removing altogether the tension between the 
competing Core Innovation Trap and the need for higher-ambition 
innovation.  
 
Business model implications 
Like the SPFC, the RFC model implies that the consultancy is prepared 
and willing to spend significant resources in problem-finding activities 
before work with a client ever commences in earnest. Tension will exist 
in the business model between servicing existing clients and their 
needs, as opposed to moving on from a client in order to pursue 
another problem space the consultancy is interested in. Additionally, 
outcomes-based fees, while introducing the opportunity for higher 
reward in the long-term, makes forecasting and resourcing difficult to 
hire, which may imply a requirement for a more flexible talent and 
expenses model.  
 
Precursors 
Mars Solutions Labs takes a proactive approach to identifying complex 
social and economic challenges which require solutions, although 
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according to secondary research, their process begins with hypotheses 
as opposed to design-research-based problem-finding activities 
  
Social impact bonds, while not involving a traditional consultancy in 
today’s model, social impact bonds proactively identify challenges that 
require solving, convene investors and solutions providers, and pay a 
return to investors on an outcomes-based fee schedule  
 
Gates Foundation uses a four-stage process from identifying problems 
and developing new concepts. From there, they issue a call for 
interested partners and collaborators, issuing investment dollars and 
funding based on outcomes-based measurable targets 
 
Potential barriers 
Because of the inherent risk involved for the consultancy, there will 
remain an incentive to pursue problems where there is a hunch that a 
client will ultimately fund the project. One potential solution here is to 
phase the outcomes-based measurements, with specific targets 
indicative of the nature of the work along the innovation project 
journey even beyond problem-finding. For example, this could include 
fees released based on success milestones aligned to launch, piloting, 
testing & refining, and scaling. This added measure would provide 
incentives for the client and consultancy relationship to endure, while 
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also ensuring that innovations are following through into 
implementation.  
 
RFC also flips orthodoxies around traditional business development. 
Specifically, the concept of long-term, repeat clients through follow-on 
work is less aligned to the values of the problem-finding consultancy. 
As such, a tension may exist when consultancies face the choice of 
where their next revenue-generating opportunity lies: choosing to 
pursue a new problem-finding activity or choosing to extend work with 
an existing client and forfeiting the ability to genuinely seek out 
problems worth solving. 
 
Level of transformation required 
The RFC model represents the most ambitious of the proposed 
interventions. It introduces a new product in the form of a new 
outcomes-based offering and, by way of not being client-centric, 
implies that the consultancy will pursue new types of clients associated 
with problems that were not considered clients before.  
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7.0 Recommendations and next steps 
Building a design-led consultancy which uses any of the characteristics 
of the models explored in this project would need to be supported by 
further research and prototyping. Because this project utilized 
autoethnographic methods to explore the personal reflections of a 
single consulting practitioner in the space, a conscious decision was 
made to forego breadth of research and representative sampling in 
place of deep, ethnographic inquiry. As such, there remains more to 
learn through understanding the nuanced interactions that occur 
across different practitioners and consulting firms, each with their own 
cultures, behaviours, attitudes, and capabilities which may help to 
surface further insights and implications for the interventions proposed 
in this project.  
 
Similarly, this project would serve to be enhanced through a qualitative 
and quantitative exploration of client organizations and the 
stakeholders within them. While the research here initiated a systems-
based view of the organization as a whole, there are likely other 
intricacies and dynamics at a cultural, team, and departmental level 
that may have implications to the willingness and readiness to pursue 
higher-ambition innovations - even through the models proposed in the 
project.  
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The practitioner in this study represents one view of the consulting 
industry, with Canadian clients consisting largely of complex, 
multinational firms in financial and professional services. Given these 
limitations, the research in this project may be extended by exploring 
the specific innovation behaviours and systems patterns across 
industries, geographies, and sizes.  
 
Given the framing and limits of this major research project, there may 
also be value in exploring the broader context of actors and players in 
the innovation ecosystem beyond even client organizations and the 
consulting firms who serve them. This is much to be learned about the 
system of organizations’ clients, for example, and the dynamics at play 
in those relationships. At a macro scale, there are also likely leverage 
points for governments and non-governmental organizations and 
institutions, including incentives, grants, and policies around 
innovation and research & development at a municipal, provincial, and 
federal level. This project implies an assumption of a geographic 
boundary(s) around the system under investigation, which was not an 
explicit choice made in this project but is implicit given the perspective 
of the autoethnographic study and nature of the firms involved.   
 
With additional research, it may be possible to prototype, test, and 
evaluate the proposed models in this paper in order to de-risk the 
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transition to any given model. This prototyping could include detailing 
and generating specific configurations of business models, conducting 
evaluative interviews with client organizations and practitioners, 
building speculative financial models to understand cash flow and 
revenue implications, and even piloting on a project-by-project basis to 
measure and monitor qualitative and quantitative indicators. This 
process may also be informed by further secondary research to identify 
additional analogies, precursors, and sources of inspiration across 
industries and geographies.  
 
Finally, a more thorough assessment and scan of signals, trends, and 
drivers of change may be useful in understanding the broader forces at 
play and how those uncertainties generate possible futures for client 
organizations and consultancies. This foresight-based approach may 
provide a richer view of the plausible futures for design, innovation, 
and industry in general, leading to better-informed strategy decisions 
about the design-led consultancy of the future(s).  
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8.0 Reflections on the process 
This project has had many ironies to it.  
 
To start with, I began the investigation with a hypothesis around rapid 
innovation methods and prototyping. Could rapid innovation be used 
as a ‘wedge’ to begin the larger transformation of getting client 
organizations to eventually pursue higher-ambition innovation 
projects? And, if so, how might we embed better prototyping and rapid 
innovation competencies into our practices and clients’ practices? 
 
In the true spirit and promise of design research and problem-finding, 
what I soon discovered was that I was, myself, leading with a 
hypothesis and setting out to prove or disprove that solution. By not 
exploring the broader context of industry forces, complex system 
dynamics, and deep human issues of the people at play - I was 
exhibiting the very behaviours I was interested in overcoming. While I 
am not myself a large, complex organization, I was able to zoom out 
from these hypotheses and instead pursue a project that led with 
questions, not potential solutions.  
 
Thus, the real learnings for me in this project are two-fold.  
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First, this work is hard because it’s so easy to not do the difficult work 
in the short-term. As humans, we are not always privy to the broader 
context and problem-finding luxuries that come with the design 
researchers’ mindset. Like everyone else, we face very real emotional 
pressures that lead to the decisions we make. These decisions are far 
from rational - they are informed by our prior experiences, cultural 
upbringings, contextual social norms, personal identities, and goals & 
aspirations. The learning here is that to change the innovation 
behaviours of an organization is to deeply understand the people within 
it, and all of the complexity of how humans make the decisions they do. 
This reflection also gives me confidence that the design-led consultancy 
will, in fact, have a role to play - despite the enormous efforts of 
industry to build their own design capabilities. Because of the pressures 
explained in the paper, the design-led consultancy which moves inside 
of a larger complex organization quickly loses what made it valuable in 
the first place - the liberty and freedom of not being subject to the inner 
workings of the Core Innovation Trap.  
 
Second, on a personal level, the process of this paper has tested and 
stretched my own beliefs and values as a design researcher and 
innovation practitioner. When beginning this project, I held a 
provocative and controversial hunch that, perhaps, rapid innovation 
processes which forego problem-finding activities are the path to 
innovation effectiveness. While I knew rapid, core innovations were not 
  
 
 121 
the end goal, at a subconscious level I think the design research-
educated version of myself knew that there was something inherently 
antithetical to the emerging, integrated-thinking, innovator’s role as 
complex problem navigator in the world.  
 
Finally, the elephant in the room, so to speak, of this project: if design-
led consultancies are to continue - or increase their ability to -   play a 
significant role in shaping breakthrough innovations for clients, they 
will need to pursue problem-finding activities themselves to escape 
their own Core Innovation Traps. This is the hard work to be done 
before we design research practitioners can pursue the hard work we 
are equipped to do.  
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Appendix A: Glossary of Key Terms 
 
 
Ambition Dilemma – refers to the decision firms and executives face 
when deciding how to allocate resources between core and higher-
ambition innovation initiatives. Explained in detail on page  
 
Core Innovation Trap – refers to the tendency for firms and 
executives, when faced with the Ambition Dilemma, to pursue core 
innovation initiatives due to the system dynamics of increasing 
pressure to perform and the long-term nature of returns on higher-
ambition innovation initiatives 
 
Problem-finding & design research - –refers to parts of the design 
process whereby the designer dedicates effort not to the solution of a 
problem, but to the discovery, formulation, and framing of what 
problem is to be solved (Getzels, 1979). These activities are commonly 
referred to as the analysis and synthesis stages of design. See page 10 
for more detail. 
 
Practitioner – refers to the innovation consulting practitioner 
servicing clients 
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Design-led consultancy – refers to consultancies which utilize 
generative problem-finding and design research methods as a primary 
way of approaching, as opposed to hypothesis-led consulting as found 
in traditional management / strategy consultancies. See page 10 for a 
detailed definition and page 15 for a classification of design-led 
consultancies  
 
Rapid innovation – refers to hypothesis-led innovation processes 
which do not utilize robust problem-finding / design research methods 
and have been popularized in recent years. See page  
 
Higher-ambition innovation – refers to adjacent and 
transformational innovations as per the Innovation Ambition Matrix 
(Tuff & Nagji, 2012). The further along each axis, the greater the need 
for exploratory, generative design research. This is the case because 
each successive level of ambition implies increased uncertainty - as it is 
further away from the core business. The greater the gap between the 
markets the organization currently serves / the products the 
organization currently offers and the markets/products of the intended 
innovation effort, the more is to be learned, discovered, and designed.  
 
Pay-for-services / Pay-for-outcomes– refers to the end points of 
the x-axis of the Focus vs. Risk matrix.  On one end, we see the 
traditional consultancy business model where fees are typically paid 
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for services incurred, often fixed in contract through negotiation in the 
sales process and estimated by the firm in terms of billable hours. In 
this configuration, the revenue stream largely leaves the risk of 
pursuing innovation with the client. On the other end of the axis is the 
possibility of design consultancies placing their fees at risk depending 
on outcomes of the innovation project, which may take form in any 
number of arrangements. The key here is that in an outcome-based 
arrangement risk is shared across the boundary of client and 
consultancy, reducing the degree of uncertainty and difficulty of 
moving resources from core innovation projects to higher-ambition 
innovations. This end of the axis is represented as ‘outcome-based fees’.  
 
 
